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THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE AN) THE JUDICIAL RELEGATION
OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

TIMOTHY

V. KASSOUNI*

"[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to
liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning
without the other."
-Justice Potter Stewart.1
"Suffice it to say that even the framers of the fifth amendment saw the
wisdom of enumerating life, liberty, and property separately, and that few
of us would put equal value on the first and the third."
-Judge Stephen Reinhardt. 2

INTRODUCTION

United States Supreme Court decisions reviewing challenges based on the

Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause,3 and in particular those

* Loyola Law School, J.D. 1989; University of California, Berkeley, A.B. 1985. The author
is currently a land use attorney with Hamilton & Samuels in Newport Beach, California. Research for this article was conducted while the author was a fellow of the Pacific Legal Foundation College of Public Interest Law. Pacific Legal Foundation is a nonprofit, public interest
legal group committed to the defense of private property rights, individual freedoms, the concept
of limited government, and the free enterprise system.
1. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
2. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d
1331, 1338 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991).
3. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. This provision, also referred to as the "Takings Clause," was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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handed down in the 1980's, are notable for their obsessive preoccupation
with ripeness requirements. Although ripeness is an essential prerequisite to
federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Article II of the Constitution,4 the concept has been stretched beyond its rational limits in the
property rights arena.
In a series of decisions culminating in MacDonald, Sommer & Fratesv.
County of Yolo, 5 the Supreme Court repeatedly declined to reach the merits
of the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause challenge. The Supreme
Court based its respective holdings, with the exception of San Diego Gas &
Electric Company v. City of San Diego,6 on the property owner's failure to
submit a ripe claim. The net result is a special ripeness doctrine applicable
only to constitutional property rights claims. Conspicuously absent from this
new doctrine are the equitable considerations which formed the basis of the
Court's more established definition of ripeness. In many cases, especially
those involving First Amendment freedom of speech issues, equity has been
the strongest argument in favor of judicial review. Unfortunately, given the
Court's reluctance to grant certiorari in constitutional property rights cases,
ripeness doctrine could plague property owners for some time to
the new
7
come.

This article will begin with a general discussion of the ripeness
requirement and its relation to Article III "cases" and "controversies." It
will become apparent how the Supreme Court's traditional conception of
ripeness bears little resemblance to the formalistic test applicable to
constitutional property rights.

4. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST.
art. III. For a general critique of the "constitutionalization" of the law of federal justiciability,
see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CIf. L. REV. 153 (1987).
5. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
6. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). See infra note 64 for a discussion of San Diego Gas & Electric.
7. In the last several years, the Supreme Court has declined to review a number of cases
which have significantly curtailed private property rights. These cases include the remanded
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 1353, 1367 (1989) (no taking because "[m]eals could be cooked, games played, lessons
given, tents pitched" on plaintiff's property); Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 263
(9th Cir. 1989) (damages for a temporary taking only available for a deprivation of economically
viable use, and not for governmental action which fails to advance legitimate state interests);
Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 S.E.2d 655, 663 (N.C. 1990) (because the government
"authorized" a land use exaction, it substantially advanced a legitimate state interest); Presbytery
of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 913 (Wash. 1990) (in order to avoid "intimidating the
legislative body," takings damages not available as a matter of law if the regulation seeks to
prevent public harm); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991) (just compensation claim not ripe
because property owners failed to request an amendment to the land use law itself); Kaiser
Development Company v. City and County of Honolulu, 913 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1990)
(taking claim based on inequitable precondemnation activities requires a concurrent showing of
deprivation of all economically viable use of property); Commercial Builders v. City of
Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (no heightened scrutiny of permit exactions under the
Fifth Amendment).
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The article will then address the Supreme Court's application of the
ripeness doctrine to constitutional property rights claims, including Fifth
Amendment just compensation, due process, and equal protection challenges.
These constitutional claims will be discussed separately because a number of
courts have mistakenly held that the ripeness doctrine should be given
uniform application, when in fact it should only apply to just compensation
claims. Even among just compensation claims, ripeness rules will vary
according to the specific theory being pursued by the property owner.
The second part of the article will also address special problems
associated with the two-prong ripeness test set forth in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.'
The third part of the article will focus on what has become the most
troublesome aspect of the ripeness doctrine for lower courts; the so called
"futility exception." While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
existence of this exception, it has failed to offer any guidance as to the
circumstances in which it would apply. Similarly, lower courts cite the
exception but rarely find it applicable to a specific set of facts.
The article will include suggestions for modifying the ripeness doctrine
and its futility exception. The sole purpose of this doctrine should be
adequate federal court subject matter jurisdiction. It should not be fashioned
into a tool to serve the dilatory aims of governmental entities.

I.

TRADrrIONAL RIPENESS REQUIREMENTS

The Supreme Court has referred to Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardne9 as
"our leading discussion of the [ripeness] doctrine."" ° The reasoning of
Abbott Laboratoriesis worth exploring here, because it has been largely
ignored by courts when constitutional property rights are at issue.
In Abbott Laboratories,a group of drug manufacturers brought an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a federal
regulation which created specific labeling requirements. The Supreme Court
began its ripeness discussion by establishing an analytical framework: "The
problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." The Court was convinced that the issues
were fit for decision and that the equities tilted in favor of substantive
review.

8.473 U.S. 172 (1985).
9. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
10. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983).
11. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
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A. Fitness of the Issuesfor JudicialDecision
With respect to the first prong of the ripeness test, fitness of the issues
for judicial decision, the Abbott Laboratories Court noted that the issue
before it was "purely legal" and that the government "made no effort to
justify the regulation in factual terms."" The Court also found the
regulation to be a definitive "final agency action" 13 because it was "promulgated in a formal manner after announcement in the Federal Register and
consideration of comments by interested parties." 14
The Court's "finality" determination was largely influenced by a line of
prior Supreme Court decisions which had relied on "pragmatic" considerations.15 These decisions, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United
States, 6 Frozen Foods Express v. United States,17 and United States v.
StorerBroadcasting Company, "8 demonstrated a "flexible view of finality" 9
by finding certain claims reviewable even though the challenged regulations
were not being specifically enforced.'
In Columbia Broadcasting System, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) enacted regulations which proscribed certain contractual
arrangements between chain broadcasters and local stations.2 The FCC
refused to license local stations which maintained such contracts. 2 A preenforcement challenge was brought by CBS, which claimed an anticipated
loss of revenue as a result of lost contracts.' The Supreme Court held that
the action was ripe for review. The Court explained that, "[s]uch regulations
have the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after.
When as here they are promulgated by order of the [FCC] and the expected
conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are
appropriately the subject of attack.. .. "I
In Frozen Foods Express, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
ruled that specified commodities of a motor carrier did not fall under an
"agricultural" exemption, and that motor vehicles transporting those

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 151.
15. "The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the
'finality' element in a pragmatic way." Id. at 149.
16. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
17. 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
18. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
19. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 150.
20. These claims are often called "pre-enforcement challenges."
21. Columbia Broadcasting System, 316 U.S. at 408.
22. Id. at 411-12.
23. Id. at 419.
24. Id. at 418-19 (emphasis added).
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commodities were subject to a permitting requirement.' The District Court
dismissed the motor carrier's challenge to the ICC ruling on the ground that
the "order" of the ICC was not subject to judicial review.' The Supreme
Court disagreed:
The determination by the [ICC] that a commodity is not an exempt
agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who
are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The 'order' of
the [ICC] warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the [ICC]
to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring
criminal penalties.2 7

Finally, in Storer Broadcasting, the FCC enacted rules prohibiting
ownership of more than a limited number of broadcast stations.' In finding
a preenforcement challenge ripe for review,' the Court emphasized that
unless Storer obtains a modification of the FCC's declared administrative
policy, it cannot enlarge the number of its standard or FM stations.'
These three cases exhibited a flexible approach to the first prong of the
ripeness test because they did not require actual enforcement of the
challenged regulations. If the plaintiff could prove that its operations would
be interfered with by a final regulation, the issues would be fit for judicial
decision. The degree of interference, however, must also be considered in
determining ripeness. This is the "hardship" inquiry.
B. Hardshipto the Parties

The second prong of the Abbott Laboratoriesripeness test, hardship to
the parties, is closely tied to the first but remains a distinct inquiry. In
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Frozen FoodExpress, and StorerBroadcast-

25. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 41.
26. Id. at 43.
27. Id. at 43-44. Justice Harlan, in dissent, was troubled by the fact that the ICC order was
"directed to no one in particular and is binding on no one" and that the ICC was willing, in
individual cases, to "reconsider its determinations with respect to particular commodities...."
Id. at 47. Justice Harlan urged the Court to be "wary of establishing a procedure which would
prematurely throw into the courts questions of statutory construction not arising in the context
of concrete facts, and which does not bring to the courts even the benefit of final interpretation
by the agency assigned to administer the statute." Id.
Although Justice Harlan expressed a dissenting view, these concerns later influenced the
Court to dismiss property rights cases for lack of ripeness.
28. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. at 193-94.
29. Although the Storer BroadcastingCourt concluded that the broadcaster had "standing" to
sue, Id. at 198, the discussion seemed to encompass ripeness as well. The Court prefaced its
discussion by noting that jurisdiction "depends upon standing to seek review and upon ripeness."
Id. at 197.
30. Id. at 199-200. As in Frozen Food Express, Justice Harlan dissented: "However these
allegations are read, they assert no more than that the Commission may in the future take action
pursuant to the regulations to deny or revoke a license. Of course, if such action should ever
be taken, Storer would then be 'aggrieved.'" Id. at 208-09.
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ing, the Supreme Court concluded that the regulations at issue were "final"
and inflicted a "cognizable" injury? 1 The first prong focuses on the nature
of the regulation, while the second prong focuses on the practical effect of
the regulation on the party seeking to invalidate it.
In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court found the impact of the
regulations "sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review." 32 In order for the drug manufacturers to comply
with the labeling requirements, they would have to "change all their labels,
advertisements, and promotional materials; they must destroy stocks of
printed matter; and they must invest heavily in new printing type and new
supplies." 33 The Court went on to point out that the only alternative to
compliance would be continued use of existing material, with the concomitant
risk of civil and criminal penalties.'
When will the "hardship to the parties" be severe enough to tip the scale
in favor of judicial review? In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court
responded to the contention that a "possible financial loss is not by itself a
sufficient interest to sustain a judicial challenge to governmental action. "3
The Court held that,

[t]here is no question in the present case that petitioners have sufficient

standing as plaintiffs: the regulation is directed at them in particular; it
requires them to make significant changes in their everyday business
practices; if they fail to observe the Commissioner's 6rule they are quite
clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions.

This language rejects a mechanical test for determining "hardship to the
parties." Courts must necessarily engage in an ad hoc, case-by-case
inquiry. 7 The financial burden placed on Abbott Laboratories by having to
purchase new printing supplies and materials was considered a sufficient
"hardship" to warrant judicial review.
31. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 316 U.S. at 419.
32. 387 U.S. at 152.
33. Id. at 152-53.
34. Id. at 153.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 154. However, in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449
U.S. 232 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade
Commission was not "final agency action" because it merely stated that there was "reason to
believe" a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act had occurred. Id. at 241. Moreover,
the Court refused to equate litigation expenses with "hardship to the parties," the former being
"'part of the social burden of living under government.'" Id. at 244 (quoting Petroleum
Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)). But see Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 587 F.2d 549, 559-60 (2d Cir.
1978) (litigation expenses, in combination with other factors such as costs associated with undue
delay, could establish "hardship" under the Abbott Laboratories ripeness test).
37. "The ripeness inquiry ... necessarily consists of a case-by-case evaluative process that
weighs the interests in avoiding review-'non-fitness' and governmental hardship-against the
hardship to the plaintiff of denying review." Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close At
Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 547, 611.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/2

6

Kassouni: The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitution

1992]

THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Courts should not draw arbitrary standards for determining when the
impact of a regulation is significant enough to rise to the level of a
"hardship." For some large businesses, twenty thousand dollars is not a
significant amount of money. For a middle class property owner, twenty
thousand dollars could represent one half of an entire annual income.
C. Post-Abbott Laboratories Ripeness Cases
Of the later Supreme Court decisions applying Abbott Laboratoriesto
support ripeness, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Commission (PG&E)38 is particularly significant. PG&E involved the
question of whether California's Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources and
Development Act, which imposed conditions on the construction of nuclear
power plants, was preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act.3 9 One
provision of the state legislation imposed a moratorium on the certification
of new nuclear plants pending development of adequate technology for the
disposal of nuclear waste.'
The moratorium provision was held ripe for review. The Supreme
Court, citing the Abbott Laboratoriestest, first noted that the "question of
preemption is predominantly legal," and that the Court need not wait for
"California's interpretation of what constitutes a demonstrated technology or
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste."4
The Court then considered the hardship to PG&E of withholding judicial
review:
For the utilities to proceed in hopes that, when the time for certification

came, either the required findings would be made or the law would be
struck down, requires the expenditures of millions of dollars over a number
of years, without any certainty of recovery if certification were denied.
The construction of new nuclear facilities requires considerable advance
planning-on the order of 12-14 years.42

Substantial planning expenditures were thus sufficient to establish a
hardship under the second prong of the ripeness test. An even stronger
equitable consideration, above and beyond expenditures, was the fact that
PG&E had no assurance whatsoever that its application to build a nuclear
power plant would be approved. As will be discussed in more detail below,
this common sense reasoning has never been applied to constitutional
property rights cases.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

461 U.S. 190 (1983).
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 201.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Both prongs of the ripeness test thus require pragmatic, flexible
considerations; "final agency decision" can occur prior to actual enforcement
of the regulation,' while "hardship to the parties" contemplates the
economic impact of the regulation."
D. The Ripeness Doctrine and FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech
Courts have been readily willing to find First Amendment freedom of
speech issues ripe for review. The apparent explanation seems uncomplicated; courts believe that freedom of speech is more worthy of judicial review
and protection than other constitutional rights. A cursory glance through
most constitutional law treatises reveals the disparity. ' As one commentator
noted:
The assessment of hardship may be complicated... by the fact that some
rights are more jealously protected than others. When such rights are at
issue, ripeness may require a lower probability and gravity of any predicted
intrusion. First Amendment rights of free expression and association are
particularly apt to be found ripe for immediate protection ....46

While cases illustrating this point are numerous,47 several in particular merit
discussion.
In Steffel v. Thompson," the plaintiff was threatened with arrest for
distributing handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam. Plaintiff
argued that the application of a Georgia statute proscribing trespass violated
his First Amendment right of free speech. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the
action on the ground that "threatened" enforcement of a statute does not rise
to the level of an "actual controversy" under Article IH of the United States
Constitution.49
The Supreme Court reversed. The threat of prosecution was not
"imaginary or speculative" because the police had warned plaintiff that if the
43. "'One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive
relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593

(1923)).

44. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)
(question of whether participants in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act's
registration scheme were required to submit to binding arbitration held ripe for review because
of the "continuing uncertainty and expense" of relying on a constitutionally suspect compensation

procedure).

45. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) (Devoting 277 pages
to free speech. The Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause is afforded 20.).
46. 134 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.3 at 159

(2d ed. 1984).
47. Id.

48. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
49. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1972).
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handbilling continued he would "likely be prosecuted."' In these circumstances, the Court noted, "it is not necessary that petitioner first expose
himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that
he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights."51
In addition, the Court found strong reasons for addressing the merits of

the declaratory relief action without first requiring the Georgia state courts
to render judgment:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can
federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting
negatively
upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional princi52

ples.

This reasoning has been ignored in the constitutional property rights arena,
where one of the increasingly long list of ripeness requirements is that the
plaintiff first seek compensation in the state court before the federal courts
retain subject matter jurisdiction.53
The United States District Court in Spartacus Youth League v. Board of
Trustees of the Illinois Industrial University? made no effort to hide its
favoritism. In Spartacus,a student organization devoted to Marxism claimed
that university regulations governing the distribution and sale of literature on
campus violated its First Amendment right of freedom of speech. 55 One
regulation in particular prevented nonstudents from distributing literature on
campus on behalf of a student organization. 6
The District Court held that the mere threat of enforcement was
sufficient to establish ripeness:

"In the First Amendment area . . . a

somewhat relaxed standard of uncertainty is applicable. Injury to First
Amendment rights may result from the threat of enforcement itself, since it
may chill the plaintiff's ardor and eliminate his desire to engage in protected
expression.'

50. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459.
51. Id. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York,
385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("'[tlhe threat of sanctions may deter ... almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions'" (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).
52. Id. at 462. The Court applied this reasoning to both facial and as-applied constitutional
challenges. Id. at 475.
53. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
54. 502 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. III. 1980).
55. Id. at 795.
56. Id. at 793.
57. Id. at 796-97. See also National Student Association v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1113

(D.C. Cir. 1969) ("it appears that suits alleging injury in the form of a chilling effect may be
more readily justiciable than comparable suits not so affected with a First Amendment
interest.").
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While freedom of speech is a fundamental constitutional right, there is
no legal, moral, or prudential reason to grant it preferential status. Other
constitutional rights, such as the right of just compensation for a taking of
private property, are also worthy of judicial solicitude. As the Supreme
Court once remarked in a discussion of standing requirements, "we know of
no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or
a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might

. . .

invoke the

judicial power of the United States.""8 This reasoning should apply with
equal force to the ripeness doctrine.
The Supreme Court's traditional ripeness test is best characterized as
pragmatic. Courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the equities
of the party seeking judicial review are outweighed by the proscription
against advisory opinions, or vice-versa. As the Supreme Court noted with
respect to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
[tihe difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy' ... is
necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, ifit would be possible,
tofashion aprecise testfor determining in every case whether there is such
a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. 59

The next section will demonstrate just how far the Supreme Court has
departed from this traditional approach in the property rights arena.
II. APPLICATION OF THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE
TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CLAIMS

The 1980's was a decidedly mixed bag from the perspective of private
property rights. The victories were FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,' which established monetary
compensation as a remedy for permanent or temporary takings of property,
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,6 which established a
requirement of heightened judicial scrutiny of regulations challenged under
the Just Compensation Clause.62

58. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
59. Golden v. Zwiekler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (emphasis added)); see also Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297-98 (1979).

60. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
61. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
62. See infra text accompanying note 68.
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The losses were Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,' and the trio of cases which failed to address the merits of the
Just Compensation Clause challenge because the issue was not yet ripe.'
These three cases, though decided on procedural grounds, must be considered a loss. The time and money required to comply with myriad ripeness
requirements will prevent most middle-class property owners from pursuing
their constitutional right to just compensation. It is somewhat ironic that the
Supreme Court would formulate a heightened level of judicial scrutiny with
respect to permit exaction cases, yet also establish a complex set of ripeness
requirements that make substantive review virtually impossible when the
property owner alleges a deprivation of economically viable use.

A. Just Compensation Clause Challenges: An Overview
of the Various Takings Tests
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and

justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' In furtherance of this
goal, the Court has developed a number of tests for determining whether a
taking has occurred.
In Agins v. Tiburon, the Court noted that "[tihe application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests

. .

.

or denies an owner

economically viable use of his land."'

63. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For further discussion of Keystone, see infra text accompanying
note 78.
64. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 34849 (1986).
In 1981, the Supreme Court also decided San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Cty of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In that case, the plaintiff sought damages in inverse condemnation
when its property was rezoned from industrial to agricultural and placed within an open-space
designation. The issue presented was whether the exclusive remedy for a regulatory taking is
invalidation of the offending ordinance or just compensation. The Supreme Court declined to
reach the merits of this issue because of the absence of a final judgment. Further state court
proceedings were necessary to determine whether or not there had been a taking. Id. at 633.
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the compensation question sidestepped in earlier cases.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987), the Court held that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
the payment of just compensation to the property owner, and not invalidation of the governmental regulation, whenever a taking occurs. Id. at 314-22.
Although one may wonder how a court could hold that the Just Compensation Clause does
not require just compensation for a taking, some prior decisions had held that the exclusive
remedy was invalidation. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d at 266 (1979).
65. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Yee v. City of Escondido,
112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992).
66. Agins, 477 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

11

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

The Court has also found a taking when the government frustrates a
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.67
1. Failure of a Regulation to Substantially
Advance Legitimate State Interests
Failure of a regulation to substantially advance a legitimate state interest
was the basis for the Supreme Court's invalidation of a permit exaction in
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission.'
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission (Commission) conditioned
the issuance of a rebuilding permit on the requirement that the property
owners convey an easement across their beachfront property for the benefit
of the general public. The Commission argued that "the public's ability to
see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier'
to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing
congestion on the public beaches" were all legitimate state purposes which
The Court
would justify outright prohibition of the Nollans' project.'
assumed the validity of these purposes.7°
The Commission then argued that these "legitimate state purposes" were
substantially advanced by the requirement that the Nollans' convey one-third
of their property for an easement. In rejecting this contention, the Court
noted that the "substantial advancement" test involves a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny above and beyond what a particular governmental entity
deems rational or reasonable. The Court further explained that, "we have
required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state
interest' sought to be achieved. . . not that 'the State 'could rationallyhave
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.''
The Court elsewhere described the "substantial advancement" requirement

67. See infra text accompanying note 103.
68. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
69. Id. at 834-35.
70. Id. The Court also pointed out, however, that outright prohibition of the Nollans' project
would only be allowable if economically viable use of property remained. Even assuming
"permissible purposes" would be protected by denial of a permit outright, the prohibition could
not "interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taling."
Id. at 835-36.
71. Id. at 834 n.3 (emphasis in original; citation omitted); see also Seawall Assoc. v. City of
New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (1989) (Nollan created a "close nexus" test which requires
"'semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-ends relationships'"); Surfside
Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1268 (1991) ("Nollan .
. .requires a substantial relationship between the public burden posed by proposed construction
and conditions imposed by the government to permit that construction."). But see Commereial
Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) ("we are not persuaded that
Nollan materially changes the level of scrutiny we must apply...").
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as an essential "nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction. "'
The Commission was not able to meet this requirement because the
dedication of a strip of beachfront property did not "substantially advance"
the legitimate state interest of ensuring the public's ability to see the
beach.' The Commission failed to establish the requisite "nexus" between
the adverse effects of the Nollans' proposed use and the imposition of the
exaction. The two specific "adverse effects" of the Noilans' proposed use
identified by the Commission-impairment of "visual access" to the beach
and increased use-were entirely unrelated to the requirement that the
Nollans dedicate an easement across a portion of their beachfront property.
The result, in Justice Scalia's words, was "not a valid regulation of land use
but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" '74
It is evident from the Nollan opinion that this takings test does not
require a deprivation of economically viable use, nor does it require
frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations. The focus is on the
character of the governmental regulation, as opposed to the effect of the
regulation on economic uses of property. An exaction which fails to limit
itself to the specific adverse effects of a proposed project will be an

unconstitutional taking regardless of whether the property retains other
economically viable uses.75

72. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.3. The dissents in Nollan appropriately describe this nexus
requirement as a "precise match between the condition imposed and the specific type of burden
...created by the [proposed use]," id. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and "an 'eye for an
eye'" requirement. Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. As the Nollan Court pointed out: "It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement
that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand
how it lowers any 'psychological barrier' to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy
any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house." Id. at
838-39.
74. Id. at 837 (citation omitted). The extortive nature of the Commission's exaction
requirement was in large measure the result of the Supreme Court's recognition that "the right
to build on one's own property ... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'"
Id. at 833 n.2. This undercuts California's longstanding view to the contrary that "[d]evelopment is a privilege not a right." See, e.g., Candid Enter. v. Grossmont Union High Sch.
District, 39 Cal. 3d 878, 890 (1985).
75. The Nollans already owned a small bungalow which they wanted to replace with a larger
house. With or without the exaction, the Nollans had economically viable use of their property.
No one, however, suggested that the Nollans' claim was not ripe because they did not allege a
permanent ban on the development of their property.
Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Commission, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991),
is instructional. In that case, a residential community of approximately 250 homeowners
successfully challenged an exaction imposed by the California Coastal Commission. As in
Nollan neither the Coastal Commission nor the Court of Appeals so much as considered the
possibility that the "ripeness" doctrine would be applicable. The existence of remaining
economically viable uses was utterly irrelevant.
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2. Deprivation of Economically Viable Use
Courts and scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the
"deprivation of economically viable use" takings test. Unfortunately, almost

70 years after Justice Holmes recognized the possibility that a land use
regulation could "go [ too far" and result in a taking,7' the Supreme Court
has done little to formulate any standards to help property owners and
governmental entities determine when a regulation goes "too far." 77
The primary source of confusion is Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
This case has thrown a monkey wrench into an
otherwise straightforward requirement that the government pay just
compensation whenever a regulation deprives a property owner of economically viable use of land.
In Keystone, the State of Pennsylvania enacted a Subsidence Act which
required coal mining companies to leave some of their coal in the ground to
provide support for the overlying surface estate. The purpose of the Act was
to prevent the destruction of buildings, farmland, and water supplies. 9
In concluding that the Subsidence Act did not constitute a taking of the
coal that was required to be left behind, the Supreme Court characterized
mining activity that causes land subsidence as "akin to a public nuisance. "s'
The Court therefore perceived the case as falling under a "nuisance
exception" to the Just Compensation Clause."1
Keystone did not, however, address the question of whether a regulation
which results in the deprivation of economically viable use could be insulated
from the Just Compensation Clause under the guise of a "nuisance exception." The coal mining company had "failed to make a showing of
diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania
Coal and our other regulatory takings cases"' because additional coal could
be mined. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, insisted that a taking occurs

76. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
77. The Supreme Court continues to insist that the takings question involves an "ad hoe,
factual inquirjy]." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Yee v. City of
Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992).
78. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
79. Id, at 474-75.
80. Id. at 488.
81. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
It is important to bear in mind that Mugler v. Kansas, the case which supposedly created
a "nuisance exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, was decided more than 30 years before
the United States Supreme Court even recognized the possibility that regulatory takings could
occur in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, a valid
exercise of the police power was deemed sufficient to preclude a taking. After Pennsylvania
Coal, a valid exercise of the police power could result in a taking if it went "too far" in
restricting the economically viable use of property.
82. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
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whenever a regulation deprives a property owner of all economically viable
use of land:
[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete

extinction of the value of a parcel of property. Though nuisance regulations have been sustained despite a substantial reduction in value, we have
not accepted the proposition that the State may completely extinguish a
property interest orprohibit all use without providing compensation.8

Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the facts in Keystone, the
Subsidence Act did "completely destroy" the plaintiff's interest inparticular
coal deposits." As such, Chief Justice Rehnquist found a taking requiring
just compensation because "[a]pplication of the nuisance exception in these
circumstances would allow the State not merely to forbid one 'particular use'

of property with many uses but to extinguish all beneficial use of petitioner's
property."'

83. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Rehnquist's
reasoning was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) ("None of [our cases] that employed the logic
of 'harmful use' prevention to sustain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation
wholly eliminated the value of the claimants' land"). For further discussion of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lucas, see text accompanying notes 93 and 100, infra.
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). A close reading of Mugler and
its progeny validates Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation. In Mugler, the State of Kansas
adopted a statute which prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Plaintiffs
contended that their respective breweries would, in light of the statute, be of little or no value
if not employed in the manufacture of beer. Plaintiffs did not contend, nor did the Mugler Court
conclude, that no structures at all could be built, or that there was a complete deprivation of
economically viable use of the property. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623.
In Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) a city ordinance made it unlawful for
any person to operate an establishment or factory for the manufacture or burning of brick within
described geographical limits. The Hadacheck Court was not presented with a deprivation of
economically viable use of property, because the plaintiff was free to construct residences or
other types of manufacturing enterprises on the property. Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not
allege a Fifth Amendment taking, only a violation of the Due Process clause. Id. at 394-95.
In Miller, the State of Virginia ordered plaintiffs to cut down a large number of ornamental
red cedar trees growing on their property as a means of preventing the communication of a rust
or plant disease with which they were infected to the apple orchards in the vicinity. Plaintiffs
were, however, entitled to use the felled trees, and to make any other economically viable use
of property, with the sole exception being the continued growth of red cedar trees. Miller v.
State Entom't, 135 S.E.2d 813 (1926). It should also be noted that the plaintiffs, as in
Hadacheck, did not allege a Fifth Amendment taking, only a due process challenge. Miller
cannot, therefore, be cited as a Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause precedent.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the Town of Hempstead enacted
an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating on property within its limits. Plaintiffs
failed, however, to provide evidence "which even remotely suggests that prohibition of further
mining will reduce the value of the lot in question." 369 Id. at 594. The Goldblatt Court was
not faced with the question of whether the dredging regulation could have been insulated from
the Fifth Amendment's just compensation mandate, even if the regulation had deprived the
property owner of all economically viable use.
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Lower courts have reached opposite conclusions with respect to this
question. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,"s the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the "nuisance exception" applies to cases involving
a complete deprivation of economically viable use. Similarly, in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles,"' the California Court of Appeal, on remand from the United
States Supreme Court, commented in dicta that "First English would not be
entitled to compensation even if [the governmental regulation] deprived it of
'all uses' of [land] if that prohibition substantially advances the interest in
public health and safety.""
In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 9 however, the Federal
Circuit refused to apply the "nuisance exception" to a Congressional
Subsidence Act which denied "all use of

. .

. property and completely

destroyed its value."'
The Ninth Circuit in McDougal v. County of
Imperial" also questioned the existence of a "nuisance exception" to the just
compensation requirement: "Even in those cases where the activity
restrained was akin to a public nuisance and the state's interest was
admittedly substantial, the Court has gone on to weigh the claimant's
showing of diminution of value to his property."'
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council. 3 In that case, the defendant regulated development along the South Carolina coastline by imposing statutorily mandated
setback lines.' A setback line precluded the property owner from building
residences or making any other reasonable economic use of property.95
The Court recognized that in the "extraordinary" circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, a categorical
"just compensation" requirement will be triggered.' Categorical treatment
may be avoided only if the proscribed use of land was always unlawful under
traditional background principles of nuisance and property law. 7
These background principles cannot be "newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself.""8

Previously

86. 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), reversed 112S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Fora discussion of the Supreme
Court's opinion, see text accompanying note 93, infra.
87. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353.
88. Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).
89. 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1176.
91. 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 678.
93. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
94. Id. at 2889.
95. Id. at 2290.
96. Id. at 2893.
97. Id. at 2901.
98. Id. at 2900.
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permissible uses (such as Lucas' previously permissible right to construct a
home on his land, prior to enactment of the setback regulations) likewise
cannot be extinguished by newly enacted "police power" legislation without
just compensation. Only if the police power rationale is coterminous with
background principles of nuisance and property law will the just compensation mandate be avoided."
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that viable economic uses of property
can be completely destroyed without just compensation. A generalized
"police power" justification for the land use regulation will certainly not
avoid the Fifth Amendment's just compensation mandate. 1" Deprivation of
economically viable use, in and of itself, remains an independent standard for
judging the constitutionality of land use regulations.
3. Frustration of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to "[frustration of]
reasonable investment-backed expectations" as a distinct takings test, 101
above and beyond the either/or test of Agins v. City of iburon."°2 While
the Court has yet to provide guidance as to the circumstances which will give
rise to a reasonable investment-backed expectation, several cases are
illuminating.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company,"r3 the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a requirement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
99. Id. As was the ease in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),
the Supreme Court in Lucas mandated heightened judicial scrutiny of land use regulations. In
Nollan, the Court required that the regulation "'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state
interest' sought to be achieved... not that 'the State "could rationally have decided" that the
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.'" Id. at 834 n.3 (emphasis in original;
citation omitted).
The Nollan Court elsewhere remarked that, "[w]e view the Fifth Amendment's Property
Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an
exercise in cleverness and imagination." Id. at 841. This language is strikingly similar to the
Lucas Court's pronouncement that "the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist
upon artful harm-preventing characterizations." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2898 n. 12, and that "to
win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses
Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they
violate a common law maxim . . ." Id. at 2901.
100. See text accompanying note 99, supra.
101. "The Court. .. has identified several factors that should be taken into account when
determining whether a governmental action has gone beyond 'regulation' and effects a 'taking.'
Among those factors are: 'the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and
its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.'" Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Prunevard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
83 (1980) (emphasis added)). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 175; Kirby Forest Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
The "character of the governmental action" and the "economic impact" factors would seem
to embrace the "substantial advancement of a legitimate state interest" and "deprivation of
economically viable use prongs" of the takings test as articulated in Agins.
102. 447 U.S. at 260.
103. 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984).
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and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that applicants for pesticide registration
disclose trade secrets resulted in a taking of property without just compensation. Three distinct time periods were analyzed: applications submitted
prior to October 22, 1972;14 applications submitted between October 22,
1972, and September 30, 1978; o1° and applications submitted on or after
October 1, 1978.11
The Court found the reasonable investment-backed expectations of
Monsanto "overwhelming" with respect to the middle time period, and held
that these expectations alone "disposed of the taking question." 7 As the
Court explained,
the Federal Government had explicitly guaranteed to Monsanto and other
registration applicants an extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive
use. This explicit governmental guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable
investment-backed expectation. If EPA... were to now disclose tradesecret data . . . EPA's actions would frustrate Monsanto's reasonable
investment-backed expectations with respect to its control over the use and
dissemination of the data it had submitted. 101

Significantly, the Court was not concerned with Monsanto's remaining
economically viable uses, which is also a distinct takings test. Denial of
reasonable investment-backed expectations, in and of itself, was sufficient to
establish a taking:
That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they are disclosed-for example, as bases from which to develop new products or
refine old products, as marketing and advertising tools, or as information
necessary to obtain registration in foreign countries-is irrelevant to the
determination of the economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's
property right."

The reasonable investment-backed expectations analysis should not be
confused with vested rights rules adopted in some states, which are usually
grounded on the contract principle of equitable estoppel.110 A taking can
104. Prior to amendments made in 1972, FIFRA was silent with respect to the Environmental

Protection Agency's authority to disclose trade secrets. Id. at 1008.
105. This time period reflects a FIFRA amendment which gave applicants "explicit assurance"
that trade secrets would not be disclosed. Id. at 1011.
106. FIFRA was amended in 1978 to grant applicants a 10-year period for exclusive use of
data submitted in connection with an application for registration. Id. at 994.

107. Id. at 1005.
108. Id. at 1011.
109. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal.
3d 785 (1976); Lakeview Development Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290 (9th
Cir. 1990):
In contrast to a taking or deprivation claim, the gravamen of a 'vested rights' claim
is that the landowner has a right to a particular use of his land because he has relied
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occur pursuant to this theory absent the element of equitable estoppel. The

Supreme Court alluded to this point in KaiserAetna v. United States.'
In Kaiser Aetna the Court addressed the question of whether a marina
created through the dredging of a private pond became subject to the
"navigational servitude" of the federal government, thereby creating a public
right of access." 2 The Court concluded that public access would impinge
the private property right to exclude others.' In reaching this conclusion,
the Court responded to the contention that the United States was "estopped"
to deny the private ownership of the marina by consenting to its construction:
But what petitioners now have is a body of water that was private property
under Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel dredged by
them with the consent of the Government. While the consent of individual
officials representing the United States cannot 'estop' the United States,.
. . it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the
concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the
Government must condemn and pax
for before it takes over the manage1

ment of the landowner's property

4

The concept of reasonable investment-backed expectations thus provides
an independent standard for judging the constitutionality of a land use
regulation. 115 These expectations need not rise to the level of an "estop-

to his detriment on a formal government promise (in the form of a permit) stating that
he can develop that use. The claim is thus a species of governmental estoppel.
Id. at 1295 (citing Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
985 (1971)). For a thorough review of the vested rights doctrine, see Richard B. Cunningham
& David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the LandDevelopment Process, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 625 (1978).
111. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
112. Id. at 165-66.
113. Id. at 179-80.
114. Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
115. The Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, should quiet debate on this
point. In that case, the Court addressed, among other things, the question of whether a property
owner who has not been deprived of all economically viable use may nevertheless be entitled
to just compensation:
Justice Stevens criticizes the "deprivation of all economically beneficial use" rule as
"wholly arbitrary," in that "[the] landowner whose property is diminished in value
95% recovers nothing," while the landowner who suffers a complete elimination of
value "recovers the land's full value." This analysis errs in its assumption that the
landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to
compensation. Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our
categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again, '[tihe
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and... the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly
relevant to takings analysis generally.
112 S.Ct. at 2895 n.8 (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted)).
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pel" under state vested rights law. 116
B. The Ripeness Doctrine and the Just Compensation Tests
In order to assess the "ripeness" of a constitutional property rights
claim, it must first be determined which just compensation theory is being
pursued. In Williamson County and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, the
Supreme Court's primary reason for refusing to address the merits of the just
compensation claim was an inability to determine whether the regulation had
gone "too far" with reference to the economic impact on the property. 117
In language reminiscent of Yogi Berra, the Court said that it "cannot
determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the
regulation goes.""'
This type of ripeness requirement should be applicable only if the
property owner is pursuing a just compensation claim based on the deprivation of economically viable use. In that circumstance, the court must know
"how far" the regulation goes. If, on the other hand, a property owner
argues that a regulation fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests
or frustrates reasonable investment-backed expectations, remaining economically viable uses will not defeat a just compensation claim.119
1. Agins v. City of Tiburon: The First Layer of the "Ripeness" Cake
Agins v. City of Tiburon' was the first of a string of Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause cases in which the Supreme Court failed to
reach the merits of the as-applied challenge.' Agins does not, however,
provide an accurate description of the ripeness doctrine as it exists today.
The doctrine has been expanded and refined to such a extent that compliance

116. In Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals
insisted upon the independence of federal constitutional property rights:
That the property interest allegedly protected by the Federal Due Process and Taking
Clauses arises from state law does not mean that the state has the final say as to
whether that interest is a property right for federal constitutional purposes. Rather,
federal constitutional law determines whether the interest created by the state law
rises to the level of "property" entitled to the various protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 615.
117. In Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, the first case to recognize regulatory takings, Justice
Holmes noted that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
118. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348.
119. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Ruckelhhaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
120. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
121. The court has always addressed the merits of facial Just Compensation Clause challenges.
See infra note 255.
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with Agins alone will not be sufficient to establish ripeness.
In Agins, the City of Tiburon enacted a zoning ordinance which placed
the plaintiffs' property in a Residential Planned Development and Open Space
Zone.'" This designation allowed the Agins to build between one and five
single-family residences on their five acre tract.'" The Agins' complaint
against the City sought damages for inverse condemnation, and a declaration
that the zoning ordinance was facially unconstitutional.'" The complaint
specifically alleged that the rezoning of the land "'completely destroyed the
value of [the Agins'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever...'.
.,"5
The Court refused to address the merits of the as-applied inverse
condemnation action: "Because the [Agins] have not submitted a plan for
development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no
concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning
provisions."'

The Court did, however, reach the merits of the facial claim. Because
the ordinances did not prevent the "best use" of the Agins' land, nor
extinguish a "fundamental attribute of ownership," their mere enactment did
not constitute a taking.'" The Agins were free to pursue their "reasonable
investment backed expectations" by submitting a development plan.'"
A ripe as-applied inverse condemnation challenge thus required the
submission and rejection of a development plan. The Agins Court did not,
however, decide just how many development proposals would have to be
submitted before the just compensation claim would be ripe for review.
Property owners are still waiting for an answer to that question."

122. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 258.
126. Id. at 260.
127. Id. at 262.
128. Id. It is not entirely clear why the Court referred to the phrase "reasonable investment
expectations" to describe the Agins' taking theory. Because the Agins alleged a deprivation of
economically viable use, it would seem that the case should have been analyzed under this part
of the takings test.
129. The Supreme Court touched upon this issue in an earlier case, Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In that case, Penn Central claimed
that New York's Landmarks Preservation Law had taken private property without just compensation by preventing the development of air space above the Grand Central Terminal. Penn
Central had submitted two separate plans for the construction of an office building atop the
terminal, but the Landmarks Preservation Commission disapproved them both. Id. at 130.
For several reasons, the Court held that the Preservation Law's interference with Penn
Central's air rights was not of sufficient magnitude to require just compensation. First, the
Court was not able to determine whether the Preservation Law would deny Penn Central the use
of its air space because only two development plans were submitted: one for a 55-story building
and the other for a 53-story building. It was unknown, the Court noted, whether a "smaller
structure" would have been approved. Id. at 137.
Second, even if the Commission would not approve any development plan, Penn Central
still retained transferable development rights which "mitigate whatever financial burdens" the
Preservation Law imposed. Id.
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1. Williamson County and MacDonald,Sommer & Frates: The Second,
Third, and Fourth Layers of the Ripeness Cake
Although the Supreme Court's holdings in Williamson County Mission
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City"M and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo" rested on procedural grounds, they have inflicted a great
deal of damage on private property rights. Indeed, more damage was
inflicted than if the Court had simply upheld the constitutionality of the land
use regulations.
This is due in large part to the amorphous nature of the holdings. A ripe
claim under Williamson County and MacDonald, Sommer & Fratesrequires,
among other things, a "final, definitive position" from the government as to
the type and intensity of development that will be allowed." Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate what constitutes a "final, definitive position."
Nor did it acknowledge the fact that land use planners routinely deny
development proposals without the slightest indication of what would be
deemed satisfactory.133
Any judicially created obstacle to a property owner's pursuit of just
compensation is a victory for governmental entities. Delay has become a
well-honed, tactical weapon of the government; more destructive, in many
ways, than substantive takings doctrine.
One often reads judicial opinions and government briefs which forewarn
the "chilling effect" on proper land use planning if certain regulations were
to require just compensation."
Strangely absent is concern over the
potential "chilling effect" on private property rights if owners are required
to spend years in court without any assurance that their just compensation
claims will even be reviewed. Fueled by judicial apathy and funded by tax
dollars, government has the "deep pockets" to string out litigation. Middleclass property owners are not so fortunate.
Williamson County involved a taking claim based on an alleged
deprivation of economically viable use. The property owner contended that
it was entitled to construct over 400 residential units pursuant to original
In light of the Court's reference to the economic viability of transferable development
rights, the discussion of alternative development plans was largely irrelevant, and cannot be read
as a "holding," but merely as dicta.

130. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
131. 477 U.S. 340 (1985).

132. 473 U.S. at 191.
133. "It is a rare land use regulator who doesn't say that, if the owner would only come back
with a different plan or at a different time, the new plan would be evaluated on its merits and
the result might be different. Agencies can thus be expected to argue that no case is ever 'ripe,'
because no denial is ever truly 'final.'" Berger, Ripeness Test for Land Use Cases Needs
Reform: Reconciling Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP., 8, 58 (1988).
134. For examples of this phenomenon, see Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution:
The Supreme Court Establishes New GroundRules ForLand-Use Planning,20 URB. LAW. 735,
739-43 (1988).
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zoning designations, but the local government would only allow the
development of 67 units under a revised zoning ordinance. 135
The District Court jury awarded the property owner $350,000 for a
temporary taking. The District Court then granted the government's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that a temporary
deprivation of use, as a matter of law, cannot constitute a taking."' The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the fact that the
property had no economically viable use during the time between the
government's refusal to approve the higher density development and the
jury's verdict.
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, finding the property owner's claim "premature" even though it had
"passed beyond the Agins threshold."137 There were two separate grounds
for this finding. First, the property owner did not obtain a "final decision"
regarding the application of the new zoning ordinance and subdivision
regulations to its property."' Although the government rejected the
original development proposal for failure to comply with the new zoning
ordinance, the property owner did not seek "variances" which would have
allowed the higher density development to proceed.' 39
Second, the property owner did not utilize the procedures Tennessee
provided for obtaining just compensation." 4 This requirement refers to the
Court's oft repeated admonition that the Just Compensation Clause is
designed "'not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per
se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.'"' 1

Thus, if the state offers an adequate

procedure for obtaining just compensation, "the property owner cannot claim
a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure
and been denied just compensation."142

MacDonald, Sommer & Frateswas also decided on "ripeness" grounds,
but added an inventive new twist. In that case, the property owner submitted
a tentative subdivision map for the creation of 159 single-family and
multifamily residential lots. 4 The government rejected the application,
citing inconsistencies with its general land use plan, and inadequate sewer
135. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 178-179, 182.
136. The United States Supreme Court later ruled that temporary takings are indeed compensable. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
137. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 185.
138. Id. at 186.
139. Id. at 188.
140. Id. at 186.
141. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 494 U.S. 1, 10, (1990) (quoting First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. at 315
(emphasis in original)).
142. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195.
143. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 342 (1986).
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and police service.'" The property owner then filed suit, claiming the
government appropriated all economically viable use by restricting the land
to an open-space agricultural designation."
The government in turn
claimed that the land retained other uses, such as ranch and farm dwellings,
and agricultural storage facilities."
Once again, the Supreme Court found itself unable to address the merits
of the just compensation claim. Although the property owner received a
response to its subdivision proposal, the Court held that the Board of
Supervisors had not yet issued its "'final, definitive position regarding how
it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.'" 147
The Court noted that the property owner's complaint alleged the denial of
only one intense type of residential development: "Appellant does not
contend that only improvements along the
lines of its 159-home subdivision
14
plan would avert a regulatory taking." 8
The MacDonald, Sommer & Frates Court cited Williamson County at
length, but there was no precedent whatsoever for its basic holding.
Williamson County established the requirement that a property owner obtain
a "definitive position" regarding application of regulations to a specific
development proposal. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, however, went one
giant step further by requiring a "final and authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property." 49 A specific development proposal can be conclusively rejected under
Williamson County, yet still not be ripe for review because the government
has not yet expressed an opinion on other possibleproposals. Just how many
other proposals must be submitted to establish a ripe claim cannot be
determined from the opinion.
"Ripeness" under Williamson County and MacDonald,Sommer & Frates
thus requires a "final, definitive" decision from the government regarding the
application of its land use regulations to a specific development proposal,
including a request for a variance; a "final and authoritative" determination
of the type and intensity of development that will be allowed; and exhaustion
of state compensation procedures. These requirements have been repeatedly
applied by lower courts in dismissing just compensation cases on procedural
grounds.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 351 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191).
Id. at 352 n.8.
Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
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3. Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency: The Attempt to Create the Fifth Layer of the Ripeness Cake
Williamson County and MacDonald, Sommer & Fratesare by no means
the last word on the ripeness doctrine. The Ninth Circuit, under the guise
of "administrative relief," attempted to add yet another "ripeness" hurdle for
property owners seeking redress under the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause; application for an amendment to the land use law
itself. This attempt was later rebuffed by a different panel of the Ninth
Circuit,"5 but one suspects that the controversy is not over.
In Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,15 ' a group of property owners challenged the express provisions
of a regional land use plan adopted by the defendant, on the
52 ground that it
deprived them of all economically viable use of property.1
The Ninth Circuit dismissed as unripe the property owners' second and
fifth causes of action for damages resulting from the regulatory taking of
private property without just compensation. The Court concluded that the
property owners were required to request that TRPA amend the Regional
Plan before they filed the action, and that their failure to do so rendered
unripe their taking claims. 53
The court reasoned that an application for an amendment to the Regional
Plan would afford petitioners the opportunity for an administrative remedy
regarding their plans for development." This administrative remedy, the
court noted, "offers the same possibility regarding development as does a
system for requesting variances."" 5 The court found no reason to distinguish an application for administrative relief, as required in Williamson
County, from an application for an amendment to the land use law itself:
"Certainly as long as the process is limited and reasonably short in duration,
and is guaranteed to culminate in either a 'yes' or a 'no,' we believe the
plaintiffs are required to pursue it. "156
This article will proceed to discuss each ripeness requirement separately,
with reference to applicable lower court decisions. One reason for this level

150. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153
(9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter TSPC II]. This case was brought by the California property owners.
The first case was brought by the Nevada property owners. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter TSPC I).
151. 911 F.2d 1331, rev'd 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 1333.
153. Id. at 1336. The Ninth Circuit's "holding" appears to be the opinion of a single
judge-the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt. Judge Fletcher, in her special concurrence, stated that
she is not "in agreement" as to the "ripeness" portion of the opinion, as she "would not reach
the ripeness issue." Judge Kozinski, in his partial dissent, took clear exception with the
"ripeness" holding of the per curiam opinion. Id. at 134447.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. TSPCI, 911 F.2d at 1339.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

25

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

of detail is to emphasize the importance of the specific type of taking theory
being pursued by the property owner. Most courts, the Supreme Court
included, have failed to acknowledge the relationship between the ripeness
requirements and the various takings tests.
C. The FirstFinalityRequirement: Application of Land Use
Regulations to a Specific Development Proposal
Williamson County's requirement that a property owner obtain a final,
definitive decision from the government regarding the application of land use
regulations to a specific development proposal is easily the least burdensome
of the three post-Agins ripeness requirements outlined above.
The central core of the requirement, application for a variance, should
only applicable when the property owner's development proposal does not
fall within the parameters of the governing land use regulation. 7 Recall
that in Williamson County, the local government refused to grant a development application because it failed to comply with the terms of a newly
owner
enacted zoning ordinance.' 58 The Court thus required the property
59
to request a variance from the terms of the new zoning ordinance.
If, however, a property owner submits a development application which
complies with existing land use regulations, it is nonsensical to require an
application for a variance. A variance from what?
This point was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Del Monte Dunes at
In that case, two successive
Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey."
property owners submitted five separate development applications. After
receiving a fifth and final rejection of a tentative subdivision map application,
the property owner filed an action seeking damages for a taking of private
property without just compensation, and for violations of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. 6
In its discussion of the Williamson County variance requirement, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the City of Monterey "does not dispute that
appellants have submitted a formal development application that the City has
rejected." 62 More significantly, the Court recognized that the application
complied with the city's land use regulations. An application for a variance
was therefore not required:
Because the nature and density of appellants' proposed development did not

conflict with express terms in the City's zoning ordinances or its general
land use plan, a variance would not have led to tentative map approval, and

157. See text accompanying note 160, infra.
158. See text accompanying note 135, supra.

159. 473 U.S. at 188.
160. 920 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 1499-1500.
162. Id. at 1502.
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the failure to seek a variance does not affect the ripeness of appellants'

claim. "'

In California, even if a development proposal conflicts with applicable
land use regulations, the variance requirement of Williamson County may still
be meaningless. Governmental entities in that state are expressly prohibited
from granting a variance for a use of property which is inconsistent with
applicable zoning regulations. 1" The government simply lacks the authority to grant relief by means of a variance.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized this point in Herringtonv. County of Sonoma. " In Herrington, the property owners filed a Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause challenge when the local government rejected an application for a 32-unit subdivision and subsequently downzoned the property to
100-acre minimum lot sizes."
The application was well within the
parameters of the local government's general land use plan, which set a
maximum density of 35 residential units for the 540 acre property, but
conflicted with the zoning ordinance. 1" The local government argued on
appeal that the property owners were required to apply for a variance before
their constitutional claims would be ripe for review." 6 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this contention:
[The variance requirement] need not be met in this case because pursuit of
a variance was not a legally viable option. Five months after rejecting the
32-unit subdivision proposal, the Board adopted the Specific Plan, which
rezoned the Herrington's [sic] property to agricultural use. This designation only allowed residential development with a minimum lot size of
100 acres. The testimony of two County planning witnesses indicated that

the only means of obtaining approval of the 32-lot proposal was through a
General Plan amendment.
stestimony finds support in Cal. Gov't Code
§ 65906, which prohibits the granting of a variance for a use not expressly

authorized by the zoning regulation that governs the land in question.
Residential development in lots under 100 acres is not an agricultural use,

and thus could not be authorized by variance under section 65906."6

The United States Claims Court also recognized the inapplicability of the
Williamson County variance application requirement when the government

163. Id. The Court referred to the ripeness doctrine's "futility exception" in refusing to
require a variance application. Other aspects of the "futility exception" will be discussed in
Section II.D.
164. California Government Code § 65906 provides in part: "A variance shall not be granted
for a parcel of property which authorizes a use or activity which is not otherwise expressly
authorized by the zone regulation governing the parcel of property."
165. 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), amended in part, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. Id. at 1492.
167. Id.
168. 857 F.2d at 568.
169. Id. at 570 (emphasis in original).
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lacks the authority to issue one. In Beure Company v. United States,'7 the
property owner entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of six acres
of a 13-acre parcel. 71 Because the parcel was a wetland, the property
owner was notified that a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers would
have to be obtained. 17 After the property owner agreed to several mitigation conditions, the Army Corps of Engineers determined that provision
would also have to be made for the preservation of the calcareous fen, a
Although the property owner agreed to
threatened plant species."
dedicate over three acres of the parcel for the preservation of the fen, the
Army Corps of Engineers refused to grant the fill permit. 174 The property
owner then filed an inverse condemnation action on the ground that the
permit denial resulted in the deprivation of all economically viable use.'75
In concluding that the property owner's claim was ripe for review, the
Claims Court emphasized the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers did not
have the statutory authority to grant a variance: "Defendant has not pointed
to any procedures in the Corps regulations that permit a landowner to seek
either a variance or other analogous relief from a Corps decision."176
Del Monte Dunes, Herrington, and Beure thus demonstrate that the
variance application requirement need not be satisfied if the development
proposal is consistent with applicable land use regulations, or if the local
government does not have the authority to issue a variance."

170. 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988).
171. Id.at 43.
172. Id. The Army Corps of Engineers has a certain degree of regulatory jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act for the
purpose of improving water quality, "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Pursuant to this goal, Seetion 404(a) of the Clean
Water Act authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to "issue permits... for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a). The Act defines navigable waters as "waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
Whether potholes and vernal pools are "navigable waters" is a matter of continuing
controversy. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
173. Beure, 16 Cl. Ct. at 45-46.
174. Id. at 46.
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id. at 49.
177. See also Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989). In Hoehne, the
property owners submitted an application for the subdivision of a 60-acre parcel of land into
4 separate lots. One of the lots was to be developed by the property owners for their retirement
home, and the other three were to be sold. The application was consistent with existing land
use regulations, which permitted single-family residences on five-acre minimum lot sizes. The
local government denied the application and subsequently amended its general land use plan to
permit only 40-acre minimum lot sizes on the property. Id. at 53 1.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the development application was "perfectly permissible
under the zoning ordinance's minimum lot size." Id. at 533. Because the local government,
by legislative act, subsequently changed the zoning designation of the property, "[it would have
been futile for the Hoehnes to seek a zoning variance to accommodate their application .. ."
Id. at 534. In addition, variances were simply "not available for exceptions to the requirements
of the General Plan." Id. at 535.
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For similar reasons, Williamson County's finality requirement should not
apply to a taking claim based upon failure of a regulation to substantially
advance legitimate state interests. A local government's attempt to exact
property or fees from a landowner in exchange for issuing a building permit
is not normally justified by an express, general land use plan or ordinance
which allows for variances. Absent this type of relief mechanism, the
decision is final once the exaction is imposed.178
D. The Second Finality Requirement: Type and
Intensity of Development That Will Be Allowed
The "finality" requirement of MacDonald,Sommer &Frateshas become
one of the most arduous obstacles facing private property owners in their
pursuit of just compensation for overburdensome land use regulations. Much
of the blame lies with the Supreme Court, which created the requirement that
a property owner obtain a "final and authoritative determination of the type
and intensity of development legally permitted" 79 without recognizing the
fact that governments simply don't make these "determinations."
Some courts, perhaps sympathetic to the financial and emotional plight
of property owners faced with their fourth or fifth rejection, have suggested
artificial limits on the number of applications that must be submitted before
the just compensation claim will be ripe for review."
Other courts
proceed on a case-by-case basis in an attempt to determine whether the
reapplication requirement would constitute an "unfair procedure." 81
While well intentioned, neither the "artificial limit" approach, nor the
"unfair procedure" approach, is a satisfactory solution to the problem created
by MacDonald, Sommer & Frates. They simply fail to address the inherent
illogic behind the reapplication requirement.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates is a classic example of the ripeness
doctrine being "molded to meet the dictates of the substantive claim on the
merits." 1" The underlying rationale for the reapplication requirement is

For further discussion of Hoehne within the context of the "futility exception," see infra
notes 223-233 and accompanying text.
178. The Williamson County "finality" requirement would, however, apply to a taking claim
based on the frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations: "Until a property owner
has 'obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision
regulations to its property,' 'it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable
beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests ha[veJ been destroyed.'" MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986) (quoting Williamson County,
473 U.S. at 186, 190 n.ll, emphasis added)).
179. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates,477 U.S. at 348.
180. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501
(9th Cir. 1990).
181. "A property owner is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise
unfair procedures in order to obtain this [finality] determination." MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7.
182. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 165.
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that a court "cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless
it knows how far the regulation goes."" Yet this also serves as a critical
factor in determining whether there has been a taking under the "deprivation
of economically viable use" prong of the takings test. If a property owner
cannot submit evidence that the land use regulation goes "too far," there will
not be a taking.
By dismissing the property owner's just compensation claim for failure
to obtain a "final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of
development legally permitted, "l" the Supreme Court relied on substantive
takings principles. If a property owner submits evidence that the denial of
just one development application works a taking, there is no logical reason
why the claim is not ripe. The property owner need only convince a trier of
fact that lesser uses would not be economically viable. Under the Supreme
Court's reasoning, however, a property owner would have to prove that a
taking has already occurred before the case will be ripe for review.
A second look at the facts and procedural posture of MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates will illustrate this point. Recall that the property owner
submitted an application for the subdivision of his land into 159 single-family
and multi-family lots, which was consistent with the density provisions of the
applicable zoning ordinance."8 The local government denied the application, citing inadequate street access, sewer service, water supplies, and police
protection. 1 6 The property owner then filed suit, alleging that the government appropriated the "entire economic use" of the property, and had
refused to provide the public services."
The trial court sustained the government's demurrer. The court reasoned
that deprivation of the property's "entire economic use" was an insufficient
allegation to sustain a cause of action for inverse condemnation."'
The California Court of Appeal affirmed: "'The denial of that particular
plan cannot be equated with a refusal to permit any development.... [The
refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the
landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development.'"

'

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and reasoning of the

Court of Appeal.
The fundamental error in this reasoning is that appellate courts are not
equipped to decide questions of fact. The property owner alleged a
deprivation of the "entire economic use" of land. Implicit in this allegation

183. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 342-43.
186. Id. at 343.
187. Id. at 344.
188. Id. at 346 n.4. Perhaps the trial court was not aware that in California, as in most
jurisdictions, factual allegations are "deemed admitted by defendant's demurrer." Thompson
v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 746 (1980).
189. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 347.
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is that a less intensive use would not be economically viable. If this factual
allegation cannot be proven at trial, then the property owner loses. 19°
There is no reason, however, to dismiss the case on "ripeness" grounds
without giving the property owner an opportunity to make this factual
showing.
In Zilber v. Town of Moraga,91 the District Court recognized that

MacDonaldSommer & Fratesonly makes sense if less "intensive" development proposals are economically viable:
The teaching of Williamson and MacDonald was that courts should not
speculate about whether a city will apply a zoning statute to preclude all
beneficial use.
Consequently, the property owner must pursue any

procedures by which he may develop available beneficial use of the

property before challenging application of the statute. However, implicit
in this rule is the premise tha the statuteleaves some beneficial use to the

property owner. If it does not, then submission of a development

application to obtain approval for a beneficial use would be pointless and
therefore no speculation about the outcome of the application would be
necessary. 12

In determining whether a property owner has complied with the
reapplication requirement of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, courts should
focus not on the "type and intensity" of development in the original applica-

tion, but rather the "type and intensity" of development allowed under the
zoning ordinance. If a development application is consistent with the zoning
ordinance, but is nevertheless rejected, the local government should be
required to identify an acceptable alternative."
This will avoid the
190. Of course, the property owner could still recover on a "frustration of reasonable
investment backed expectations" taking theory, which does not require deprivation of all
economically viable use. See supra notes 101-116 and accompanying text.
191. 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
192. Id. at 1199 n.5 (emphasis added).
193. This has already been suggested by the United States Claims Court in Beure Co. v.
United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988):
To comply with [the MacDonald, Sommer & Frates] mandate, especially in situations
where a takings claim is plausible, a regulatory agency that denies a development
plan should specify to the extent it reasonably can based on the information before
it, the aspects of the plan that are inconsistent with the regulations and the changes
that would be necessary to result in issuance of the permit, i.e., specify the type of
development that generally would be permitted consistent with the regulations.
Id. at 50 n.9.
The California Legislature, in Government Code § 65589.5, has similarly required
governmental entities to explain the reason for denying housing development projects:
When a proposed housing development project complies with the applicable general
plan, zoning, and development policies in effect at the time that the housing
development project's application is determined to be complete, but the local agency
proposes to disapprove the project or to approve it upon the condition that the project
be developed at a lower density, the local agency shall base its decision regarding the
proposed housing development project upon written findings supported by substantial
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inherent inequity of requiring property owners to submit repeated applications in an effort to determine what type of development the local government would deem acceptable.
Courts should also be careful to limit the ripeness rule of MacDonald,
Sommer & Fratesto cases involving the "deprivation of economically viable
use" theory of recovery. When recovery is sought on other bases, such as
failure of a regulation to substantially advance legitimate state interests or
frustration of reasonable investment backed-expectations, a claim can be
triggered by a single governmental act, whether it be the rejection of a
development application or the imposition of an exaction."
As noted above, a just compensation claim based on the frustration of
reasonable investment-backed expectations does not require a concomitant
showing of deprivation of all economically viable use. Recall that in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,95 the Supreme Court concluded that a taking of
trade secrets occurred through frustration of reasonable investment-backed
expectations, even though the trade secrets retained other uses. These other
uses, the Court noted, were "irrelevant to the determination of the economic
impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property right."19
This same reasoning applies in the land use context. The Supreme Court
has often said that a property owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations must be "more than a 'unilateral expectation' or an abstract
need.'" 1"
However, a development application which complies with
existing zoning, as in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, cannot be labeled a
"unilateral expectation." Zoning designations are the result of legislative
planning and deliberation. They are not "dreamed up" by property owners.
If a governmental entity decides to reject a development application

evidence on the record that both of the following conditions exist:
(a) The housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact
upon the public health or safety unless the project is disapproved or approved upon
the condition that the project be developed at a lower density.
(b) There is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the adverse
impact identified pursuant to paragraph (1), other than the disapproval of the housing
development project or the approval of the project upon the condition that it be
developed at a lower density.
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65589.5 (West 1992).
194. See supra text accompanying note 68.

195. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
196. Id. at 1012. One of the economic uses of a trade secret is its "competitive edge" over
the products of another company. "[D]isclosure or use by others of the data," the Court noted,
"would destroy that competitive edge." Id.
It would have been illogical for the Court to require Monsanto to establish a deprivation
of all economically viable use in order to recover under the reasonable investment-backed
expectations theory. If Monsanto were able to establish deprivation of all economically viable
use, there would be no need to consider possible interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations as well, because a taking would have already occurred. Any other approach would
render the reasonable investment-backed expectations taking theory sheer surplusage.
197. Id. at 1005 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980)).
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which complies with existing zoning, then it does so at the risk of destroying
the investment-backed expectations of theproperty owner. Thegovernmental
entity should only be able to avoid this result by specifying an economically
viable alternative, or by amending the zoning designation. 19
The MacDonald, Sommer & Frates finality requirement is equally
inapplicable to a just compensation claim based on the failure of a regulation
to substantially advance legitimate state interests. This type of claim is
grounded on the "character of the governmental action " 199 as opposed to
the effect of the governmental action on the economically viable use of
property. It is not necessary to determine "how far" the regulation goes in
determining the value of the property if the regulation cannot sustain itself
as a valid exercise of the police power." °
E. Request for Amendment to the Land Use Law Itself
In Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TSPC 1),1 ° 1 the Ninth Circuit attempted to create yet another
ripeness requirement that a property owner apply for an amendment to the
land use law itself. In conjunction with the already burdensome requirements
of finality and exhaustion of state compensation procedures, this new requirement would have transformed the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
mandate into a theoretical pipe dream for private property owners. Although
a different panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the land use law amendment
requirement,' the issue is likely to recur and warrants comment.
There are several reasons why amendment to the land use law, as part
of the ripeness doctrine, would have significant impacts on private property
owners-impacts which were not even considered by the Ninth Circuit in
TSPC L First, land use applications can carry hefty price tags. Some cities
and counties charge thousands of dollars in fees just for the privilege of
asking for an amendment to the land use law.
Second, the cost of developing the information needed to support an

198. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (once court determines that a taking has occurred, government retains
the option of amending the offensive regulation).
199. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
200. The only opinion holding that a just compensation claim based on the failure of a
regulation to substantially advance a legitimate state interest requires a concomitant showing of
deprivation of economically viable use, Griffin Homes, Inc. v. City of Simi Valley, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 792 (1991), was ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court. This is the same
California Court of Appeal which held that the California Coastal Commission's exaction in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), did not violate the United States
Constitution. In Nollan, Justice Scalia noted that the Court of Appeal's views were inconsistent
"with the approach taken by every other court that has considered the question." 483 U.S. at
839.
201. 911 F.2d 1331 (1990).
202. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TSPC 11),
938
F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1991).
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application to amend a land use statute or ordinance can be enormous. Most
general land use laws in California (called "general plans") consist of
hundreds of pages of detailed policy and environmental analysis prepared by
professional land use planners and funded by tax dollars. California actually
requires all general plans to contain a number of mandatory elements,
including the impact of land use designations on housing, conservation,
noise, safety, open space, and transportation?" A general plan amendment
application, which would have been required by the Ninth Circuit's deision,
would have to address these mandatory elements. Private property owners,
the majority of whom are middle-class families on fixed budgets, should not
be required to hire environmental consultants and experts at astronomical fees
in order to "formally" request an amendment to a land use law.
If the property owner's amendment application did not include this type
of detailed policy and environmental analysis, what would prevent a
governmental entity from refusing to even consider the application? If the
application were deemed incomplete for this reason, the property owner
would never be able to seek just compensation for a regulatory taking
because the case would never be ripe.
The substantial amount of time it would take to submit a complete
amendment application also raises statute of limitations problems. In JSPC
I, the property owners were faced with a 60-day statute of limitations to
initiate litigation "arising out of the adoption or amendment of the regional
plan."'
It would be virtually impossible to gather the necessary information for an amendment application in such a short period of time, especially
in California, where it often takes years for cities and counties to amend their
general plans.'
Finally, some local governments in California have adopted ordinances
and charter amendments which require voter approval for any amendment to
the general plan. Property owners who request such amendments are often
required to personally pay for the cost of special elections. One such charter
amendment was adopted by the voters of Monterey, California.'
Proper-

203. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 1992).
204. See California-Nevada Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, art. VI(j)(4), Pub. L. No. 96551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800-66801 (West 1992); NEv. REV. STAT.
§§ 277.190-277.200.
205. But see Stephans v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 n.2 (D.
Nev. 1988): "Since this Court finds that the TRPA has not yet taken 'final action' with respect
to Plaintiff's property, Plaintiff's taking claim is not barred by the Compact's statute of
limitations. Hence, if Plaintiff is unable to gain redress through TRPA's administrative avenues,
she may then pursue her taking claim through a ripe and timely complaint." Id.
206. The charter amendment reads in full:
Section 9.1 Voter ApprovaL
The City Council shall first secure voter approval of any proposed amendment to ay
element of the General Plan of the City or any amendment to the Zoning Ordinance
of the City, as approved on November 1, 1990, which does any of the following:
(1)
Increases residential density,
(2)
Increases allowable floor area,
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ty owners in these jurisdictions would have to pay for a special election
before their Fifth Amendment just compensation claims would be ripe for
judicial review.'
These common sense concerns were completely ignored by the Ninth
Circuit in TSPC I, which focused solely on the fact that "TRPA specifically
invites amendment proposals and promises action on them within a
reasonable time. "Is
This simplistic, rigid view of the land use legislative process fails to

recognize the due process rights of property owners. Perhaps this was the
result to an inherent belief that the constitutional rights of property owners
are of collateral importance: "Suffice it to say that even the framers of the
fifth amendment saw the wisdom of enumerating life, liberty, and property
separately, and that few of us would put equal value on the first and the
third. "'

Aside from these public policy omissions, the Ninth Circuit in TSPC I
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
a)
b)

Changes the use designation or zoning of residential land to a more
intensive use,
Increases the maximum permitted height in any zone,
Reduces the minimum required usable open space,
Rezones existing open space, or
Allows or facilitates
annexations which involve any commercial prezoning or,
annexations which involve residential prezoning resulting in a density
greater than R-1-20000.

Section 9.2 Procedure.
The proposed amendment or annexation referred to in Section 9.1 shall be
heard by the City Council in the usual manner for such actions. At the conclusion
of hearings to consider an amendment to the General Plan or Zoning Ordinance, or
to allow or facilitate annexation, the Council shall approve or deny the proposed
action. If the action is approved, the Council shall immediately stay implementation
of the action pending approval by the voters, and shall set the matter for determination by the electorate. Any election shall be paidfor by the applicant. No election
shall be required in the case of denial of proposed actions. This section shall not be
construed to limit the power of the Council to approve, deny, or modify any proposed
amendment or annexation.
The Council may set the election at any general election or special election.
The Council shall adopt the amendment or annexation approved by the electorate
without change at the next regular or adjourned meeting of the Council following
certification of the election results.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the power of City council
to adopt more stringent land use regulations, moratoriums, or allocation of resource
regulations. (Emphasis added.)
207. Concededly, a local government must first establish a general plan amendment procedure
before TSPC I would apply. As the Court noted, "[ci]rcial to our decision is the fact that
TRPA specifically invites amendment proposals and promises action on them within a reasonable
time." 911 F.2d at 1337. Most local governments have already implemented these procedures.
TSPC I certainly provides an incentive for those which have not.
208. TSPC 1, 911 F.2d at 1337. Recall that in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967) the United States Supreme Court required courts to "evaluate both the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration"
when addressing ripeness issues. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
209. TSPCI, 911 F.2d at 1338 n.5.
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mistakenly argued that its holding was consistent with Williamson County's
requirement that a property owner obtain a "final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue."210 Crucial to this
reading of Williamson County is the belief that a property owner must utilize
any mechanism which provides relief from the terms of a regulation. As the
Ninth Circuit said, "[w]e find nothing in the Compact that prevents property
owners from using this amendment procedure to obtain the same resultsthey
could obtain by way of variance; thus, we are unable to draw any distinction
between the two forms of relief that is not purely formal.""'
There are several reasons (public policy notwithstanding) why a
distinction should be drawn between a variance procedure and an amendment
procedure. A variance provides relief from the applicationof a land use
regulation. This is perfectly consistent with Williamson County's requirement that a property owner obtain a final decision regarding the "application" of a land use regulation to his or her property.212 For this reason,
the granting of a variance is an adjudicatory function.213
The adoption and amendment of a general land use plan, on the other
hand, is a legislative function.2 4 7SPC I would have required a property
owner to seek legislative relief through an amendment to the land use law
itself, as opposed to adjudicatory relief by means of a variance from the
application of the land use law.
To illustrate the absurdity of this requirement, consider its possible
application outside the land use context. Suppose the City of Chicago
adopted an ordinance which on its face prohibited blacks from becoming city
attorneys. 15
Suppose further that the City of Chicago set up a procedure whereby
aggrieved blacks could request an "amendment" to this ordinance, for a
modest fee of $5,000. Would any court in its right mind dismiss a lawsuit
challenging the validity of this discriminatory policy because the plaintiff did
not first pay $5,000 to request the Chicago City Council to change its mind?
The obvious answer is no.
Yet why does the result differ simply because the plaintiff is asserting
the constitutional right to make reasonable use of property? The only

210. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilson Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
211. TSPCI, 911 F.2d at 1337 (emphasis added).
212. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
213. See Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.3d 511, 518 (1980).
214. "[E]very California decision on point... has held that the enactment or amendment of
a zoning ordinance is a legislative act." Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.
3d 511, 517 (1980). The enactment or amendment of a general plan is likewise a legislative act.
See Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal.3d 561, 570 (1984).
215. The plaintiffs in TSPC I contended that the general land use plan on its face resulted in
a taking of private property without just compensation. TSPC 1, 911 F.2d at 1333. TSPC i
notwithstanding, courts have never applied a traditional "ripeness" analysis to facial just
compensation claims. See cases cited in note 255, infra.
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plausible explanation, one which the Ninth Circuit in 7SPC I commendably
revealed, 216 is that property rights, as opposed to other constitutional
rights, simply don't merit the care and attention of the federal courts.
Judge Kozinski, in a scathing dissent, addressed the fallacy of a ripeness
rule requiring an application for amendment to the land use law itself,
especially when combined with the Williamson County "finality" requirement:
An amendment... requires an exercise of political judgment. Political
processes are, by their nature, infinite. A change in the makeup of the
legislative body, a shift in the political winds, or even a change in attitude
based on further experience or additional wisdom, may be a sufficient
reason for a political body to change its mind. In fact, a political body
needs no ascertainable reason at all for changing course; it is constrained
only by the Constitution and the principles of political accountability.
There is thus no way for a court to say that
217 a legislative process has come
to rest with respect to a challenged law.
The distinction between "legislation" and "adjudication" is in fact the

logical edifice which supports the Supreme Court's insistence that the Fifth
Amendment is designed "'not to limit the governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.'"218
If the enactment of a regulation results in a taking, that regulation
"necessarily implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. '"219 The governmental entity, if it chooses, can then amend or repeal
the intrusive regulation. ' This converts the taking to a temporary or
lesser one. 1 A taking nevertheless results and no case suggests that a
property owner, to obtain compensation, must first formally ask the
government to amend or repeal the regulation. The rationale underlying the
Ninth Circuit's per curiam opinion-a rationale which requires affected
property owners to beseech the government to amend or repeal its intrusive
regulation as a condition to compensation-totally fails to mesh with the

216. See supra note 209.
217. TSPC 1, 911 F.2d at 1345-46 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
218. Prescault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (quoting First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
(emphasis in original)). See also Corn v. City of Lawndale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 587 ("A
regulation may meet the standards necessary for exercise of police power but still result in a
compensable taking.")
219. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. at 315 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
220. Id. at 321.
221. Id. at 317-18.
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concepts articulated by the Supreme Court in First Church.2
Curiously, only one year before TSPC I, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a property owner need not apply for an amendment to the general land
use law. In Hoehne v. County of San Benito,' the property owners
submitted an application for the subdivision of a 60-acre parcel into 4
separate lots with the intention of building their retirement home on one of
the lots.'
This application was consistent with the county's zoning
ordinance, which permitted single-family residences with a five-acre lot
size.? After denying the subdivision application, the county amended
its general plan and zoning ordinance to permit only 40-acre minimum lot
sizes. 7 The District Court resolved the property owners' inverse condemnation action by granting the county's motion for summary judgment, in part
because the application rejection was not "final."'
The Ninth Circuit reversed. In rejecting the county's argument that the
property owners were required to apply for an amendment to the general
plan's slope density requirements, the court emphasized the fact that it
"would have been futile for the Hoehnes to seek a General Plan amendment
in their favor, because supervisors had amended the General Plan in a
manner clearly and unambiguously adverse to the applicationof the landowners."' The Court went on to note that the "act of rezoning," which
is legislative in nature, "is the strongest possible, if not irrefutable, indication
that the County is opposed to any subdivision of this land."I
The Hoehne court did not hold that a property owner is never required
222. Prior to First Church, there was great debate over the appropriate remedy for a taking.
Governmental entities contended that the sole remedy was invalidation of the intrusive
regulation. Property owners contended that just compensation was the appropriate remedy. See
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 628 (1981).
The property owners' principal argument (aside from the fact that the Fifth Amendment
expressly requires just compensation) was one of public policy: vital governmental programs,
which would otherwise be accomplished by means of eminent domain, should not be
"invalidated" simply because the property owner has been deprived of a "stick" in his property
rights "bundle." For a thorough development of this argument, see Giedeon Kanner, Inverse
Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177 (1980).
The Ninth Circuit's per curiam opinion in TSPC I, which would have required property
owners to apply for an amendment to the land use law, could very well resurrect this debate.
223. 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989).
224. Id. at 530.
225. Id.
226. The San Benito County Planning Commission denied the application for two reasons: the
site was not physically suited for the proposed development because of excessive slope; and the
proposed improvements were likely to cause environmental damage. The County Board of
Supervisors affirmed the Planning Commission's decision, and added a third reason: the
quantity of water would be inadequate in drought conditions. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 535 (emphasis added). See also Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488,
amended 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (general plan amendment not required because government
planner testified that it would have "no chance" of being approved).
230. Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 535.
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to apply for an amendment to the land use law itself. The court held that
under the facts of the case, an amendment application would have been an
"idle and futile act." 1 A different set of facts could have yielded a
different result.
The case is significant, however, because it indicates that general land
use laws can represent the "final" views of a local government. The fact that
the Hoehnes' property was rezoned to a 40-acre minimum designation was
sufficient, in and of itself, to establish "finality."' 2 Hoehne thus stands
for the general rule that amendment applications are "futile" when the
express terms of the land use law conflict with the property owner's
development proposal. This is to be contrasted with Herrington, wherein the
Ninth Circuit refused to require a general plan amendment based on the
testimony of the governmentplanner, as opposed to the express terms of the
land use law. 3
As noted earlier, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit has expressly
rejected the land use amendment requirement. In Tahoe-SierraPreservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TSPC II),' the Ninth
Circuit, citing Judge Kozinski's dissent in TSPCI, held that "ripeness did not
require the plaintiffs to amend the 1984 plan before bringing their
claim." 5 It is doubtful, however, that this issue has been finally laid to
rest.
F. Exhaustion of State Compensation Procedures
Williamson County created two separate "ripeness" requirements:
finality with respect to the application of a land use law, and exhaustion of
state compensation procedures. The latter requirement has been the sole6
ground for the dismissal of numerous constitutional property rights claims.2
The central inquiry is whether, at the time of the alleged taking, the state

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See note 169, supra.
234. 938 F.2d 153 (1991).
235. Id. at 157.
236. See Austin v. City and County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988); Four Seasons
Apartment v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985); Culebras Enter. Corp. v.
Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (lst Cir. 1987); Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu,
649 F. Supp. 926 (D. Haw. 1986); Boothe v. Manatee County, 812 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1987);
Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1990); Cassettari
v. County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987); Jama Const. v. City of Los Angeles, 938
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1991); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51 (lst Cir. 1991);
Lerman v. City of Portland, 675 F. Supp. 11 (D. Me. 1987); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785
F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson County, 721
F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala. 1989); Beachy v. Board of Aviation Comm'ns, 699 F. Supp. 742
(S.D. Ind. 1988); Martinez v. Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, 736 F. Supp. 413 (D. P.R.
1990); Wintercreek Apartments of St. Peters v. City of St. Peters, 682 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo.
1988); Calibre Spring Hill, Ltd. v. Cobb County, 715 F. Supp. 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Abbiss
v. Delaware Dept. of Transp., 712 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Del. 1989).
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has an adequate mechanism for providing just compensation. If no such
mechanism is available, the property owner may bring suit directly in federal
court. 37

In Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,"' for example, the Court of
Appeals held that the property owner was entitled to bring suit directly in
federal court because at the time of the alleged taking the Florida Supreme
Court believed that equitable relief was the "exclusive remedy" for
confiscatory zoning regulations. 9 Similarly, in Sierra Lake Reserves v.
City of Rocklin," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a rent
control challenge could be brought directly in federal court because state
appellate courts "explicitly rejected compensation.""
Even if the state has not indicated whether just compensation is an
available remedy, courts have held that, absent explicit language rejecting
just compensation, property owners must first exhaust state compensation
procedures.'2
Williamson County's second "ripeness" requirement has several
problematic aspects. First, because it revolves around "compensation," it
should not apply when the property owner is seeking other forms of relief.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,-' the Nollans did not seek
"just compensation" when the California Coastal Commission attempted to
"take" their beach without paying for it. The Nollans instead sought a writ
of mandate to compel the California Coastal Commission to issue a building
permit without the extortive condition.'
In this circumstance, the property owner should be able to file a
declaratory relief action directly in federal court. The procedural posture
would be analogous to the plaintiffs' claim in Duke Power Company v.

237. Of course, all states must now provide just compensation for regulatory takings. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). Prior to First Church, however, a number of states only allowed for equitable relief.
If the alleged taking occurred in one of these states prior to First Church, the property owner
may file directly in federal court. As the Supreme Court stated in Williamson County, "all
that
is required is that a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' exist
at the time of the [alleged] taking." Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (citations omitted).
238. 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
239. Id. at 1517. See also Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v.City of Monterey, 920 F.2d
1496, 1507 (1990); Furey v.City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448, 1450 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986);
Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
240. 938 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991).
241. Id. at 955.
242. See Austin, 840 F.2d at 681 ("[a]lthough we find no case that recognizes inverse
condemnation as a cause of action, neither do we find one that rejects it"); Southern Pacific
TransportationCo., 922 F.2d at 505 n.8 ("[c]laimants are required to seek compensation in state
courts before filing federal complaints even when state remedies are uncertain and undeveloped"); Littlefield, 785 F.2d at 609.
243. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
244. Id. at 828.
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Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.'

In that case, the plaintiffs

sought a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act, which imposed a
$560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the

operation of federally licensed private nuclear power plants, was unconstitutional.'
The Supreme Court held that the Price-Anderson Act did not "take"
plaintiffs' property, nor did it deprive the plaintiffs of due process and equal
protection of laws.' 7 Before reaching this conclusion, however, the Court
addressed the question of whether the "taking" claim could only be adjudicated in Claims Court, pursuant to the Tucker Act.'

The Court pointed out

that the claim did not need to be brought in Claims Court provided plaintiffs
were seeking declaratory relief, not damages:
Mr. Justice Rehnquist suggests that appellees' 'taking' claim will not
support jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)], but instead that such a
claim can be adjudicated only in the Court of Claims under the Tucker
Act. .

.

. We disagree. Appellees are not seeking compensationfor a

taking, a claim properly brought in the Court of Claims, but are now
requesting a declaratory judgment.... While the Declaratory Judgment
Act does not expand our jurisdiction, it expands the scope of available
remedies. Here it allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a
declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action
before potentially uncompensable damages are sustained. 2 9
This reasoning should apply with equal force to the Williamson County
requirement that a property owner first seek "compensation" in state court.
If the taking claim seeks only declaratory relief, or other equitable remedy,
and not "compensation," then the property owner should be able to file suit
directly in federal court. Several courts have addressed the merits of the
taking claim when declaratory or injunctive relief, and not compensation, is
the remedy sought.'
245. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
246. Id. at 67.
247. Id. at 87, 94.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1990) ("[tihe United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon the Constitution").
249. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 71 n.15 (emphasis added); see also Ohio Student Loan
Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894, 898 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1990) (Tucker Act inapplicable because
plaintiffs were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, not monetary damages); Hahn v. United
States, 757 F.2d 581, 588 (3d Cir. 1985) (federal District Court, not Claims Court, retains
jurisdiction over nonmonetary claims); State of Tennessee ex reL Leech v. Dole, 749 F.2d 331,
336 (6th Cir. 1984) ("a claim is only cognizable under the Tucker Act if it is for money
damages and is based on a source of substantive law mandating compensation by the Federal
Government"); State of Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 858 (8th Cir. 1983); Smith v.
United States, 654 F.2d 50, 52 (Cl. Ct. 1981); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d
1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981).
250. See, e.g., Mountain Water Company v. Montana Dep't of Public Service Regula-tion,
919 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1990); Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (Ist Cir. 1990). But
see Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51 (Ist Cir., 1991): "'mTfhe [Williamson] Court's
ripeness analysis would be completely neutered if its holding were applied to damage claims
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This conclusion is supported by New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans," where the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that a declaratory relief action brought by a utility company
directly in federal court was "no different in substance from a facial
challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute or zoning ordinance-which
we would assuredly not require to be brought in state courts. " 2
Indeed, in a line of cases stretching from Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. 3 to Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictise
the Supreme Court has consistently addressed the merits of "facial" just
compensation
claims without applying the traditional "as-applied" ripeness
5
test.2 5
It would be especially absurd to apply the "exhaustion of state compensation procedures" requirement to declaratory relief claims involving the failure
of a regulation to substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest.
Suppose, for example, the government imposes a commercial development
"fee" of $5 per square foot for the purchase of avant-garde art to be located
in a public park ten miles from the development. If the property owner
successfully argues that this type of "fee" is facially unconstitutional in light
of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' the obvious remedy would

alone.'" Id. at 64 (quoting Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F.Supp. 159, 164 (D.R.I. 1985).
251. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
252. Id. at 372 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
253. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
254. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
255. The Keystone Court (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. at 294-96), emphasized the distinction between "as-applied" and "facial"
just compensation claims:
'Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it
presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the [Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation] Act to particular surface mining operations or its
effect on specific parcels of land. Thus, the only issue properly before . ..this
Court, is whether the 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a
taking.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added); see also Yee v.
City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992) (facial challenge ripe for review); Martino v.
Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1983) ("the failure to
submit a development plan is not, in and of itself, a bar to an attack on the ordinance on 'its
face'"); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.
1987), amended, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (1988) (District Court "properly recognized the [property
owner] may challenge the zoning restriction on the basis that the mere 'enactment' of the
restriction constitutes a taking of its property"); Beacon Hill Farm Assoc. v. Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors, 875 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1989); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 724 n.14 (11th Cir. 1990); Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (1988); Crow-New Jersey 32
Limited Partnership v. Township of Clinton, 718 F. Supp. 378, 381-83 (D. N.J. 1989).
However, in Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 922 F.2d 498, the Ninth Circuit
extended Williamson County's "exhaustion of state compensation procedures" requirement to
facial challenges. Id. at 505-07.
256. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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be invalidation of the ordinance which established the fee. It would be
unreasonable to insist that the ordinance itself is constitutional, and that the
property owner's only remedy is "just compensation" by way of a refund of
the $5 per square foot fee. 5 7
There is a risk, however, that the federal courts will dismiss an inverse
condemnation action seeking declaratory relief on the ground that the United
States Constitution does not prohibit a taking, but rather prohibits a taking
without "just compensation."" Thus, it might be argued, a court cannot
determine whether or not a "taking" has occurred unless the property owner
has unsuccessfully attempted to secure compensation from the state.
On the other hand, it makes little sense to require property owners to
seek just compensation from the courts, as opposed to the governmental
entity which imposed the regulation. The better approach is to allow
property owners the right to litigate directly in federal court once the
governmental entity denies just compensation.
Williamson County's second "ripeness" requirement also raises troubling
questions regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel. 59 What is to
prevent a federal district court from dismissing an inverse condemnation
action because the taking claim has already been defeated in state court?
This is precisely what occurred in Yee v. City of Escondido.'
In Yee, the property owner contended that an initiative measure which
imposed rent controls on mobile home parks resulted in a taking of property
without just compensation. 1 A parallel action filed in federal court was
stayed pending exhaustion of all state court remedies. 6 2 After the California Court of Appeal held that the initiative measure did not result in a taking,
and after the California Supreme Court denied review, the property owner
pursued the parallel federal action. Remarkably, the District Court dismissed
3
the action, citing the res judicata effect of the state court judgment.6
The United States Supreme Court might have known that its "exhaustion
of state remedies" requirement would effectively close the federal courthouse

257. Of course, if the property owner successfully pursued an as-applied challenge to the $5
per square foot fee, just compensation would be the mandated remedy for a "temporary taking."
But see Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260. (No just compensation required for taking
based on failure of a regulation to substantially advance legitimate governmental interests).
258. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
259. Res judicata means "claim preclusion." It prevents a plaintiff from seeldng further relief
on the same claim in a separate action. Collateral estoppel means "issue preclusion." It bars
the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation
between the same parties. See 18 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES § 4402 (1981).
260. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349 (1990), affinned 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
261. Id. at 1352.
262. Id. at 1351 n.1.
263. United States District Court, Southern District, No. CV-89-0234-B (CM). The United
States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See
Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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doors to aggrieved property owners?" While the Supreme Court has not
yet overruled Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, which made the Just Compensation Clause applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the res judicata effect of final state court
judgments could do just that.
Solutions to this judicially created quagmire are few and far between.
The property owner could file an inverse condemnation action directly in
federal court and allege a violation of the federal constitution and, by way
of pendant jurisdiction, a violation of the state constitution." This would
conserve judicial resources, avoid protracted litigation, and ensure the
continued applicability of the federal Just Compensation Clause to overzealous state land use regulations.
G. Substantive Due Processand Equal Protection Challenges
Because Williamson County and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates relate

solely to just compensation claims involving deprivation of economically
viable use, 7 lower courts have had to determine whether the myriad
ripeness requirements of these cases also apply to substantive due process and
equal protection challenges.
This issue will become increasingly important if more and more courts

264.
If increased state autonomy and reduced federal case loads can be purchased only
with the coin of more constitutional violations and fewer constitutional remedies, the
price is high.... If we want to nominate a particular group of cases for exclusion
from the federal courthouse, we should look at groups in which federal law is not
sensitively at issue rather than at one in which fundamental constitutional rights are
at stake.
Speech of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at the New York University School of Law (Nov., 1984),
quoted in David A. Kaplan, Justice Blackmun, in Talk, Makes a Pleafor Sec. 1983, 7 NAT'L
L. J., at 23, col. 1 (1984).
265. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
266. The Ninth Circuit suggested this procedure in Lockary v. Kayfetz, 908 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1990). In that case, the Court of Appeals dismissed a precondemnation blight taking claim
because the property owners did not first attempt to procure relief in state court. The court
noted, however, that on remand the District Court may permit the property owners to amend
their complaint to include a pendant state law precondemnation blight claim. Id. at 549. See
also Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1404 n.4 (9th Cir.
1989) ([allthough plaintiffs' taking claim is not ripe for our review, it would be entirely
appropriate on remand for the district court, in the interest of judicial economy ... to permit
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a pendent state law taking claim).
267. In Williamson County, the Supreme Court noted that substantive due process and equal
protection challenges were not at issue. 473 U.S. at 182 n.4. The Court's discussion of the
Due Process Clause was limited to the government's contention that the remedy for a taking was
invalidation of the restrictive land use regulation, and not just compensation. Id. at 197-200.
This argument was of course rejected in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
Similarly, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, the Supreme Court's
discussion of ripeness was limited to regulatory takings claims. 477 U.S. 348 (1987).
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direct their creative energy toward abolishing substantive review of just
compensation claims. Should the trend continue, property owners may be
tempted to take the easier route of seeking judicial review of substantive due
process and equal protection claims. They might accordingly abandon their
effort to obtain "just compensation" for burdensome governmental regulations.
This approach carries with it great risk. Substantive due process analysis
is limited to a determination of whether the governmental action is "arbitrary
and capricious" under a rational basis standard.'
The "takings" test,
however, mandates a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.'
The "takings" test also mandates just compensation whenever the property owner
suffers a deprivation of economically viable use, irrespective of the
regulation's "validity" as an exercise of the police power.
As noted above, Williamson County's first ripeness requirement is that
the property owner receive a final decision from the government regarding
the application of regulations to a specific development proposal. Lower
courts have uniformly held that this ripeness requirement applies to
substantive due process and equal protection claims.'
It is important to
emphasize, however, that this requirement is distinct from the question of
whether the property owner must also exhaust administrative remedies. The
Williamson County Court expressly stated that substantive due process claims
may be brought without exhaustion of administrative remedies."7
Williamson County's second ripeness requirement, exhaustion of state
compensation procedures, is not applicable to due process and equal
protection claims. This is because the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, unlike the Just Compensation Clause, do not contain provisions
validating the challenged governmental action upon the payment of just
compensation. The government is prohibited from denying due process and
equal protection of the laws, whether it providesfor just compensation or
not. As the Supreme Court noted, "because the Fifth Amendment proscribes
takings withoutjust compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied." 2'
268. "The guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the objective sought to be obtained." Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) (citations omitted).
269. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
270. See Noreo Const. Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986); Kinzli v.
City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1455-56 (D.C. Cal. 1985); Shelter Creek Development
Corporation v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1988); Herrington v. County of
Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (1987), amended in part, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (1988); Unity Ventures v.
County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1988); St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199,
202 (9th Cir. 1989).
271. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. at 192-93. See also Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
272. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13 (emphasis in original).
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The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the inapplicability of the "exhaustion
of state compensation procedures" requirement to due process and equal
protection claims in Sinaloa Lake Owners Association v. City of Simi
Valley?' The property owners in Sinaloa filed an inverse condemnation
and due process action against the defendant when it breached a privately
owned dam.'7 4 The defendant contended that the due process claim was
not ripe because the property owners had not first exhausted state compensation procedures.275 The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
As a threshold matter, we reject defendants' contention that -the
second prong of Williamson County requires exhaustion of available state
compensation remedies before plaintiffs may pursue their due process claim
in federal court. This requirement, derived from 'the special nature of the
Just Compensation Clause,' [Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196 n.14],
states only that the just compensation clause cannot be violated until the

state has subsequently declined to pay for the taking; it has no application
to other types of constitutionalclaims, even where those claims arise out
of facts that also give rise to a taking claim. 6

Equally inapplicable to due process and equal protection claims is the
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates requirement that a property owner obtain a
"final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property." 2 ' This requirement
relates solely to just compensation claims involving the deprivation of
economically viable use, where courts must determine whether the regulation
has gone "too far."' 8 Due process and equal protection claims, on the
other hand, are not predicated on the regulation's economic effect. They are
directed instead toward arbitrary and capricious government action.
This has been the conclusion of every lower court which has addressed
the issue. In Eide v. Sarasota County,279 for example, the property owner

filed a due process and equal protection challenge against the local government when it denied an application for commercial rezoning. Although the

273. 882 F.2d 1398 (1989).
274. Id. at 1401.
275. Id. at 1404.
276. Id. (emphasis added). See also Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570,
1574 n.8 (1lth Cir. 1989) ("[a] property owner has been denied substantive due process ...
the moment a governmental decision affecting his property has been made in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, regardless of whether he is later compensated for that violation"); Eide v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d at 725-26 n. 16; Schnuck v. City of Santa Monica, 935 F.2d 171 (9th
Cir. 1991) (court addressed the merits of the due process and equal protection claims, but
dismissed the just compensation claim for failure to exhaust state compensation procedures).
277. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348.
278. Id. The reference is to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In that
case, Justice Holmes recognized that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
279. 908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Court of Appeals dismissed the claims as unripe,2 ° it was careful to note
that MacDonald, Sommer & Frateswas in no way controlling:
[W]ith respect to an as applied arbitrary and capricious due process claim,
the final decision hurdle is satisfied when the first prong [of Williamson
County] is met-i.e., when the zoning decision being challenged is finally
applied to the property. Thus, in an as applied arbitrary and capricious
due process claim challenging a zoning decision denying commercial
zoning, the landowner need only obtain a final decision denying commercial zoning. The MacDonald requirement does not apply to Eide's as
applied arbitrary and capricious due process claim because Eide does not
allege the deprivation of all beneficial use of his land, and, therefore,
a court does not need the additional determination in order to adjudicate his
claim.28

The same reasoning forms the basis of the argument that MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates should not be applied to just compensation claims
involving regulations which fail to substantially advance legitimate governmental interests, or which frustrate reasonable investment-backed expectations. These just compensation claims, like due process and equal protection
claims, do not require a showing of "deprivation of all beneficial use."'
In order to capitalize on this logical distinction, property owners must
clearly articulate the type of just compensation claim being pursued. Unless
this is done, courts may require the property owner to comply with both
Williamson County and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates.
H. The Futility Exception

Prior to Williamson County, several courts referred to a "futility
exception" to the ripeness doctrine.'
It was not until Justice White's
280. The property owner had failed to submit a single plan for the commercial development
of his properties. For this reason, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case as unripe, citing
W lliamson County's first prong. Eide, 908 F.2d at 726.
281. Id. at 725 n.16. See also Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541
(11th Cir. 1991); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d at 1576 n.l1:
[A] determination of precisely what use is permitted is of great relevance in ascertaining whether a taking has occurred. By contrast, a substantive due process claim
requires a demonstration that a decision is arbitrary and capricious. Discerning what
alternative uses are permitted would not seem to be significant in assessing the
arbitrariness of zoning decisions, although.., it clearly is relevant in determining
what damages result from an arbitrary decision.
282. Like Williamson County, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates only involved the "deprivation
of economically viable use" prong of the takings test. The Supreme Court has never applied its
"ripeness" analysis to the other two prongs of the takings test.
283. See American Savings and Loan Assoc. v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 371 (9th Cir.
1981) (property owner need not submit development application if compliance with local
ordinances would be futile); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(request for variance would be a "useless course" where development would be completely
contrary to the goal of preserving land in its natural state); Ogo Assoc. v. City of Torrance, 37
Cal. App. 3d 830, 834 (1974) (to require property owners to apply for a variance would be to
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dissent in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, however, that courts began
discussing the futility exception as an essential element of the ripeness
doctrine.
In Justice White's view, the government can indicate its "final" decision

with respect to a development proposal without issuing an explicit denial.'
As long as the government expresses its position to the property owner, the
ripeness doctrine will not require the submission of one or more applications.- As Justice White stated:
Nothing in our cases . . . suggests that the decisionmaker's definitive
position may be determined only from explicit denials of property-owner
applications for development. Nor do these cases suggest that repeated
applications and denials are necessary to pinpoint that position.
Moreover, I see no reason for importing such a requirement into the
'final decision' analysis. A decisionmaker's definitive position may
sometimes be determined by factors other than its actual decision on
the issue in question. For example, if a landowner applies to develop its
land in a relatively intensive manner that is consistent with the applicable
zoning requirements and if the governmental body denies that application,
explaining that all development will be barred under its interpretation of the
zoning ordinance, I would find that a final decision barring all development
has been made-even though the landowner did not apply for a less
intensive development. Although a landowner must pursue reasonably
available avenues that might allow relief, it need not, I believe, take
patently fruitless measures.
In Justice White's view, the "ripeness" requirements of both Williamson
County and MacDonald,Sommer & Fratescould be satisfied upon a showing
of futility. Although the above quote focuses primarily on the "reapplication" requirement of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, Justice White was
initially responding to the argument that a "definitive position" under
Williamson County could only be obtained through a rejected development
application.
This issue surfaced in a significant futility exception case: Kinzli v. City

of Santa Cruz. s7 In Kinzli, the voters of the City of Santa Cruz (City)
adopted an initiative which limited the Kinzlis' property to a variety of open
space uses, including timber production, agriculture, and wildlife habitat.28
The initiative also prevented the City from providing urban services to the
property." 9 The Kinzlis attempted to sell the property under a contract
which mandated the receipt of permits from the City for residential

require them to "pump oil from a dry hole").
284. MacDonald, Sonmwrs & Frates, 477 U.S. at 359 (White, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
286. Id.

287. 818 F.2d 1449 (4th Cir. 1987).
288. Id. at 1452.

289. Id.
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development.m One potential purchaser filed a development application
on behalf of the Kinzlis, but later abandoned it when he was told by a state
staff
engineer that the City could not provide water service to the proper29
ty.

1

The Kinzlis subsequently filed suit, alleging violations of the Just
Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution.'
The District Court found the Kinzlis' suit ripe for
adjudication, citing the futility exception, but nevertheless granted the City's
motion for summary judgment.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court, and
dismissed the suit on ripeness grounds.'
The Court concluded that the
Kinzlis could not argue that it would have been "futile" to submit a development application because they had not yet applied for a development
application: "The Kinzlis' taking claim... is not ripe: they have failed to
secure a 'final decision' from the City regarding acceptable uses, and the
futility exception does not excuse this failure since no 'meaningful
application' has been made."295
The Court also noted that the futility exception would excuse Williamson
County's variance requirement only if "at least one 'meaningful application'
for a variance is denied."' Because the Kinzlis did not submit an application for a variance they could not argue that it would have been futile to
apply for a variance.'
This "reasoning," which has been labeled "oxymoronic" by one
court,29 effectively prohibits application of the futility exception to the first
prong of the Williamson County ripeness test. Even though a government
official informed the potential purchaser of the Kinzli property that the City
could not legally provide water service, the Ninth Circuit still required the
submission of a development application.
A number of courts have failed to recognize the inherent illogic behind
the Kinzli rule, and have applied it in dismissing as unripe the just compensation claim.' Kinzli does not, however, foreclose application of the futility
exception to the MacDonald,Sommer & Frates "reapplication" requirement.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Kinzli v. Santa Cruz, 620 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Cal. 1985) rev'd 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir.
1987), amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1043 (1988).
294. Id.
295. Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1455.
296. Id. at n.6.
297. Id.
298. Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
299. See Lake Nacimiento Ranch v. San Luis Obispo County, 830 F.2d 972, 980-81 (9th Cir.
1987); Unity Ventures v. Lake County, 841 F.2d 770, 774-76 (7th Cir. 1987); Southern Pacific
Transportation Company v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). But see
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (1987), amended in part, 857 F.2d 567 (1988).
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The Court acknowledged that it "need not determine the point at which
reapplicationsfor development become futile."'
What facts must a property owner plead in order to establish futility?
One case suggests that actual testimony by government officials is required.
In Herrington v. County of Sonoma,"' a case which admittedly only
addressed due process and equal protection issues, the Ninth Circuit held
that a development proposal was "conclusively rejected" because of the
testimony of a government planner.'
The court expressly noted that its
holding was based on this testimony alone.'
Although the Herringtoncourt cited with approval Kinzlis' requirement
that a development application first be submitted before the futility exception
can apply, it reached the opposite conclusion. The court conceded that there
was "some controversy as to whether the Herringtons submitted even one
development application to the county, and as to whether their proposed 32lot subdivision was conclusively rejected." 5 In light of the government
planner's testimony, however, the court concluded that "[e]fforts to complete
the development application, and application for a variance, would have been
futile."' If the court had strictly enforced the Kinzli rule, it would have
been impossible for the Herringtons to even argue "futility" until they had
submitted a complete application. Herringtonimplicitly exposed the absence
of logic in the Kinzli decision.
Other courts have applied the futility exception to requests which by law
cannot be granted, or requests which conflict with unambiguous land use
regulations.' n Under this approach, the personal opinions of government
employees are irrelevant." The inquiry is focused instead on the intent
of government as expressed in the laws it passes.'
If the land use law
only permits an application for "X," it would be futile as a matter of law for
the property owner to seek an approval for "Y." In Hoehne v. County of
San Benito,31° for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a general plan
amendment application would have been futile because the local government
had already amended the general plan in a manner "clearly and unambigu-

300. Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1455 (emphasis original).
301. 834 F.2d 1488 (1987), amended in part, 857 F.2d 567 (1988).
302. After a ten-day jury trial, the Herringtons abandoned their Fifth Amendment just
compensation claims. 834 F.2d at 1493.
303. 857 F.2d at 570.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 569.
306. Id. at 570.
307. See Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir. 1989); see also text
accompanying notes 170 and 229, supra.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 529, 533..
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ously adverse to the application of the landowner. "311
Kinzli and Hoehne represent two diametrically opposed approaches to the
"futility exception." Under Kinzli, specific facts are irrelevant: as a matter
of law, "futility" cannot be established until the property owner submits at2
least one "meaningful" development application and variance request.3
Under Hoehne, however, "[o]nly the facts tell us whether a final decision has
been reached."31 3 One such "fact" would be the existence of a law which4
announces the government's view as to the acceptable use of property?.
If a development application or variance request would require the government to deviate from the law it has created, it should not have to be
submitted.
The United States Supreme Court recently weakened the precedential
impact of Kinzli. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,315 the Court
did not require the property owner to apply for a development application
because "such a submission would have been pointless, as the [defendant]
stipulated below that no building permit would have been issued under the
1988 Act, applicationor no application."31 Submission of a development
application is therefore not a prerequisite to application of the futility
exception.
CONCLUSION

The procedural barriers facing property owners who wish to enforce
their constitutional right to just compensation for overburdensome governmental regulations are becoming virtually insurmountable. Agins requires the
submission of a development application. Williamson County requires a
variance request and exhaustion of state compensation procedures.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates requires a potentially unlimited number of
reapplications.
Even if a property owner can somehow chart this Kafkaesque maze of
technical, expensive, and ultimately futile procedures, the game has only just
begun. The property owner must now convince the court that a taking has
occurred, which is another story in itself.
It is tempting, but perhaps overly simplistic, to lay the blame entirely on
the courts. Tempting because our courts have long been of the view that
property rights, in comparison with First Amendment freedoms, are just not
that important. Simplistic because our legislators also pass laws with little,
if any, concern for the impact on property rights. Our bureaucrats, with a
311. Id. at 535. For a more detailed discussion of Hoehne, see text accompanying note 226,
supra.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 533.
314. Id.
315. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
316. Id. at 2891 n.3 (emphasis added).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

51

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

Plol. 29

of property
boastful air, list the number of citizens who have been deprived
3 17
without just compensation, like so many notches in a belt.
For sound moral and political reasons the framers of the Constitution
found it necessary to include property within the Bill of Rights, of which our
courts are the ultimate guardian. As observed by Judge Kozinski, this fact
alone is reason for solicitude, not "thinly disguised contempt," from
members of the judiciary."

317. In its Tenth Annual Report, the California Coastal Commission noted that over 2,000
property owners were required to dedicate part of their land in exchange for a building permit,
without just compensation. Coastal Access Program Tenth Annual Report, Joint Rep. Cal.
Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy, at 16 (Jan. 1990).
318. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d at 1346
(Kozinsld, J., dissenting), rev'd Tahoe-sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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